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Strengthening of the United Nations system

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Letter dated 15 July 2005 from the Permanent Representatives of China and the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to transmit the text of the joint statement on the international order of the twenty-first century signed by President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China and President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation on 1 July 2005 (see annex).

We should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

(*Signed*) **Wang** Guangya
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the People's Republic of China
to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Andrey I. **Denisov**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

05-42897 (E) 210705 220705

and norms of international law. All countries in the world must strictly observe the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual advantage, and peaceful coexistence.

The rights of all countries to choose their path of development in accordance with their specific national characteristics, equal participation in international affairs and equal development must be fully guaranteed. Disagreements and disputes must be peacefully resolved, unilateral acts must be avoided and there must be no resorting to a policy of diktat or the threat or use of force.

The affairs of each country must be dealt with by its people independently, and world affairs through dialogue and consultation on the basis of multilateral collective approaches. The international community must fully rid itself of confrontational and bloc-oriented thinking, the desire to monopolize and dominate in international affairs and attempts to divide States into the leaders and the led.

3. The United Nations is the most universal, representative and authoritative international organization; its place and role in the world are indispensable. The United Nations must play a central role in international affairs and must be the centre for elaborating and implementing the basic norms of international law.

United Nations peacemaking operations must conform to the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations. It is necessary to follow strictly the corresponding Security Council resolutions and develop United Nations cooperation with regional and subregional organizations. The United Nations must play a more prominent role in the consideration of the issues of global economics and development.

United Nations reforms must aim to strengthen its central role in international affairs, enhance its effectiveness, and strengthen its potential for reacting to new challenges and threats. Reforms must be conducted on the basis of the principle of consensus and must fully reflect the common interests of a broad number of Member States.

4. The process of globalization in its positive sense is promoting world economic development through the unprecedented dynamic expansion of trade and economic relations and the widest possible openness in terms of information. On the other hand, globalization is developing in a very unbalanced way and is accompanied by an increase in the gap between developed countries and regions and the rest of the world. In order to ensure the healthy development of the processes of globalization, it is necessary to increase coordination and mutually advantageous cooperation between States and regions, reject any manifestations of discrimination in economic relations, reduce the gap between poor and rich, and promote joint prosperity by broadening and deepening trade and economic and scientific and technical exchanges.

The international community must develop a universal, mutually acceptable trade and economic regime. The path to achieving this is through negotiations on an equal footing, rejection of the use of pressure and sanctions to achieve unilateral economic concessions, and utilizing the mechanisms of the global and regional multilateral organizations.

5. The developing countries, where the greater part of the planet's population lives, are a major force that supports peace and development throughout the world. The international community must accord great attention to the task of overcoming the gap in the levels of development between the developing and developed countries. The way to carry out this task is, first and foremost, by ensuring equal access on the part of all the members of the world community to socio-economic, scientific and technical, information-related, cultural and other opportunities that are being opened up through globalization, increasing mutually advantageous "North-South" and "South-South" cooperation, and the joint development and fulfilment by the countries concerned of the corresponding obligations undertaken within the framework of the United Nations and other multilateral structures.

6. Human rights are universal. All States must respect the human rights and basic freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, promote the guaranteeing of human rights and protect them with account taken of the specific character and traditions of each country, and resolve differences on the basis of the principles of equality and mutual respect and through dialogue and cooperation. The international protection of human rights must be based on the principles of the rigorous defence of the sovereign equality of all States and non-interference in their internal affairs.

7. It is necessary to respect the historical traditions of multinational States, promote peaceful coexistence and the joint development of different peoples, and also make efforts to defend State unity. Any actions aimed at splitting up sovereign States and stirring up discord among peoples are inadmissible. The objective processes of the social development of sovereign States cannot be ignored, and models of social and political structures cannot be imposed on them from without.

8. The diversity of cultures and civilizations in the world must become the basis for their mutual enrichment, not for conflicts. The defining requirement of the world under contemporary conditions is not the "clash of civilizations", but rather the need for global cooperation. We must respect and protect the diversity of the world's civilizations and models of development. The differences in the historical heritage of all countries, their cultural traditions, social and political structure, value systems and paths of development must not become a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of another State. A dialogue between civilizations and an exchange of experience must be conducted on the basis of mutual respect and tolerance, and there is a need to enrich and complement one another on behalf of our joint advancement along the path of progress. The role of humanitarian exchanges must be enhanced in order to establish friendly and trusting relations between States.

9. The Parties call upon the international community to join efforts to create a new architecture of security based on mutual trust, mutual advantage, equality of rights and cooperation. The generally recognized norms of international relations must be its political basis, and mutually advantageous cooperation and shared prosperity must be its economic basis. The new architecture of security must be founded on respect for the equal right of all States to security. Dialogue based on equal rights, consultations and negotiations must be the means for resolving contradictions and protecting peace.

The Parties are committed to the cause of maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability, legal systems and multilateral processes in the field of

arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. They advocate the speedy entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and are endeavouring to promote the universalization and enhanced effectiveness of such arms control and non-proliferation treaties as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The Parties call for the peaceful use of outer space and preventing the stationing of weapons and an arms race in outer space and, to that end, advocate the development of a corresponding international legal agreement.

The Parties believe that, in the face of new threats and challenges, it is necessary to undertake additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the means for their delivery and corresponding materials. To achieve these purposes, the Parties are filled with determination to cooperate closely within the framework of the relevant international organizations and forums and also to broaden interaction with all other States. Proliferation problems must be tackled within the framework of international law through political, diplomatic and international cooperation.

The Parties will promote the implementation of the initiative to establish, under the auspices of the United Nations, a global system for countering new challenges and threats to security on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and corresponding norms of international law. Within the framework of the new architecture of security, international cooperation must be strengthened, and there must be a joint search for ways to deprive terrorists of financial sources and social support and eradicate the ideology of terrorism and extremism — an ideology of violence and racial, ethnic and religious discord. Double standards are inadmissible in this matter. The blatant human rights violations committed by terrorists and terrorist organizations must be firmly condemned by all members of the international community. Terrorist organizations must be prevented from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery.

10. Regional integration is an important facet of development in the contemporary international situation. The Parties note the positive role being played in the process of establishing a new international order by regional multilateral organizations operating on the basis of open regionalism, equal cooperation and a non-selective approach to other countries. In the economic field, regional initiatives must promote the greater openness and effectiveness of trade associations. In the area of regional security, the creation of an open mechanism for cooperation in the field of security that is non-selective towards other countries on the basis of the comprehensive consideration of the interests of all parties is a matter of principle. The Parties are in favour of developing horizontal links between regional integration associations and establishing a climate of mutual trust and cooperation among them.

11. The new inter-State relations being established between the Russian Federation and China are making a weighty contribution to the creation of the new international order. The practice of Russian-Chinese relations confirms the viability of the principles set forth in this Declaration and demonstrates that relations of good-neighbourliness, friendship and cooperation can be effectively developed on the basis of such principles and that various problems can be solved.

Both Parties are filled with determination to make untiring efforts, together with other interested States, to build a developing and harmonious world and to act as a major constructive force for a secure world order.

12. The establishment of a rational and just international order in the twenty-first century involves the continual search for approaches and decisions that are acceptable to all. The new world order will become truly universal only to the extent that its principles and norms are shared by all the entities participating in international life.

The Parties call upon all the countries of the world to conduct a broad dialogue on the issue of the international order in the twenty-first century. The future of the world and the ability of mankind to proceed along the path of progress and find answers to the challenges and threats that arise depend to a considerable extent on the results of that dialogue.

(*Signed*) **Hu** Jintao
President of the People's
Republic of China

(*Signed*) V. V. **Putin**
President of the
Russian Federation

Moscow, 1 July 2005

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Fifty-ninth session
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Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters

Strengthening of the United Nations system

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Note verbale dated 15 July 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit herewith a proposal by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi concerning the problem of the Security Council and the reform of the United Nations with reference to Africa and the world (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya would be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session under agenda items 53, 54 and 55.

05-42861 (E) 210705 210705

Annex to the note verbale dated 15 July 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The problem of the Security Council and the reform of the United Nations with reference to Africa and the world

The problem of the Security Council as far as Africa is concerned — irrespective of the reform of the United Nations and the enlargement of the Security Council as currently proposed — is that there should be a permanent seat for Africa on the Security Council because it is the only continent that does not have a permanent seat. This is a right of Africa, irrespective of United Nations reform or Security Council enlargement.

With respect to the United Nations reform as currently proposed, the African States are in the same position as other States seeking to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council; in other words, the right of Africa to permanent membership of the Council is an entitlement arising from the earlier phase and is tantamount to a debt owed by the world.

As for the new phase involving the addition of other permanent seats, Africa is entitled to enter the competition like the other continents, which currently have permanent seats and are requesting other seats, considering that the acquisition by Africa of a new permanent seat was not part of the previous calculations.

No African State will obtain a permanent seat other than because it is part of the African continent and has the support of Africa. Consequently, any permanent seat or seats that may be obtained will be for the African Union and for the benefit of the continent and, as such, will put an end to all competition for such seats. Competition exists at the moment because every State considers that the seat it is seeking to acquire is for its individual benefit and, as we have said, as long as the seat is for the benefit of the African Union, competition for it between States will cease. That being so, it is not important whether the seat is subject to rotation or not, and competition among States will also end and it will no longer matter which State acquires the seat. In that case, it would be preferable for the seat to go to the smallest African State and not to be exploited on a national basis. If the matter is looked at from that perspective, there will thus be no justification for making the seat a rotating one or making it permanent and competition between African States for the seat will come to an end.

This proposal represents the interests of the continent, preserves its unity and avoids fragmentation and division as a result of competition. The members of the African Union, in order to resolve the problems raised by United Nations reform and Security Council enlargement, should all sign an agreement whereby they undertake that the permanent seat will be for the African Union and not for a particular State, whether by rotation or otherwise.

On the other hand, if the new seats do not include the right of veto, those seats will have no importance and could therefore be sacrificed in return for a larger number of seats for Africa. For example, if in the past there had always been two seats for Africa, there should — given what has emerged in connection with the

reform of the United Nations and the enlargement of the Council — be four or five member States whose membership is transferred every two years to other States.

As we stated at the outset, a permanent seat for Africa is an entitlement arising from the earlier phase under which Africa must become a permanent member of the Council since it is the only continent not to be represented on the Council. This seat will have the above-mentioned characteristics and all members of the African Union will be bound by the instrument to be signed as we mentioned earlier.

If any African State tried to acquire this seat or competed for it with other States, that would be a matter for concern because that State would be seeking to gain the seat for itself; what must be emphasized here is that such a State would not have been able to win the seat otherwise than as an African State.

At a worldwide level we have begun to think aloud about the reform of the United Nations rather than the reform of one of its organs, because the matter is of such importance and gravity that it must not be reduced to that. The United Nations means the General Assembly and not the Security Council. The United Nations also comprises the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and other specialized bodies and institutions embracing different fields such as the Trusteeship Council. Nor is it merely a matter of the enlargement of the Security Council because what has been proposed to the world is the reform of the United Nations. To speak merely of the Security Council is contrary to the purpose of the reform that was needed which was principally reform of the General Assembly which represents the nations of the world. How can we call for the establishment of parliaments in countries, and for authority to be conferred on them, and say that Governments are subordinate to such parliaments, and that the parliamentary legislators are the people who have power, and that Governments must give effect to their enactments, and then do the opposite in the United Nations where we turn the world parliament, namely the General Assembly, into a talking shop? It is not permissible for us to call for democracy in the States of the world and then engage in undemocratic practices in such a forum, which do not achieve justice. What must be done is to transfer the authority of the Security Council to the General Assembly of the United Nations, thus rectifying the situation, achieving democracy and making competition meaningless. In fact, competition will end because each country would be represented in the General Assembly by its own permanent seat.

If this solution is rejected, we should abolish the General Assembly, save the costs that are wasted in running it and respect the nations that are now being treated with contempt leaving only the Security Council. At that point, talk of enlarging the Security Council and its powers would become logical. There must be equality in the injustice that currently exists, or a reduction in the degree of injustice in the Security Council with respect to its resolutions.

Problems of Security Council enlargement

It is clear, if what is now being proposed is adopted, that the Members of the United Nations will be treated with contempt and nations and peoples will be duped and made fools of. This means that there is no real intention to reform the United Nations. That is clear from the rejection of any reform of the General Assembly, and the lack of any intention to reform the United Nations — which means, in fact, the General Assembly — merely serves as corroboration. The current proposal implies that seats will be assigned to new States, but the seats are devoid of substance

because the substance of a permanent seat on the Security Council is the existence of the associated right of veto. It seems that this is a case of double-dealing and a lack of seriousness that is intended to circumvent what is being proposed in this context. It is well known that the new permanent seats, if they are given the right of veto, will change the regional and international balance giving rise to conflicts and endless repercussions that will drag the world into a cold war that may turn into a hot war. As an illustration of this and by way of example, if Germany were given a permanent seat and one were not given to Italy and if, in order to satisfy Italy, that country were given a seat on the understanding that the seat did not have the right of veto, Italy would be placated and would not be annoyed. The same applies if India, Pakistan or Japan were granted a permanent seat and Indonesia were not. Moreover, the countries that are denied the seat and are competing for it would seek to void the seat of any substance. In this way, the process is one of appeasement, makes a mockery of the United Nations and gives the incorrect impression that the Security Council has been enlarged, whereas in fact it has not been enlarged; it controls the world and is under the control of those that have the right of veto.

Ultimately, the United Nations and the countries of the world are at the mercy of five States, the other States being no more than window dressing. What they should do is to leave the United Nations out of self-respect and leave the five permanent members on their own, so as to reveal the naked truth. The United Nations consists of five States, and why should we cover up for them? The right thing is for the truth to be unveiled without any cover, falsification or fraud.

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Prevention of armed conflict

Letter dated 24 March 2005 from the representatives of Burkina Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Swaziland and Tuvalu to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

Upon instructions from our respective Governments, we have the honour to request, pursuant to Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, your attention to the recent escalation of tension in the Taiwan Strait, which was triggered by the passage, on 14 March 2005, of the so-called "anti-secession law" by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China.

We would like to stress that the enactment of the so-called "anti-secession law" threatens the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, and further endangers peace and stability in the East Asia region. This piece of legislation has been widely viewed as the legal excuse for the use of force against Taiwan.

Any threat of the use of force is in flagrant violation of the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and goes against the spirit of the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly entitled: "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all". We share the vision of collective security elaborated in the report of the Secretary-General, "In our globalized world, the threats we face are interconnected ... and that whatever threatens one threatens all."

To safeguard peace, Member States must all address threats preventively. These circumstances apply to the recent escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. We therefore strongly urge the United Nations to facilitate the necessary dialogue between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China in the hope of solving the dispute peacefully and avoiding any negative consequences.

05-43254 (E) 220705

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly under agenda item 24.

(*Signed*) Francois **Oubida**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Burkina Faso to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Mahamat Ali **Adoum**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Chad to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Crispin **Grey-Johnson**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Gambia to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Brown **Chimphamba**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Malawi to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Alfred **Capelle**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands
to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Marlene **Moses**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Nauru to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Stuart **Beck**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Palau to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Joseph **Christmas**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Saint Kitts and Nevis to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Lennox A. **Daniel**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the
United Nations

(*Signed*) Domingos Augusto **Ferreira**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Sao Tome and Principe to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Paul **Badji**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Senegal to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Collin D. **Beck**
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Solomon Islands to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Joel M. **Nhleko**
for Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Swaziland to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Enele S. **Sopoaga**
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Permanent Mission of Tuvalu to the United Nations

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Fifty-ninth session
Agenda items 45 and 55

Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Letter dated 19 July 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the position paper of the Russian Federation on reform of the institutions and mechanisms of the United Nations in the area of human rights (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 45 and 55.

(*Signed*) Andrey **Denisov**

05-43206 (E) 270705 280705

Annex to the letter dated 19 July 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Position of the Russian Federation on reform of the United Nations in the area of human rights

1. The Russian Federation has been a consistent supporter of strengthening the institutions and mechanisms of the United Nations in the area of human rights, including in such aspects as enhancing the functioning of the Commission on Human Rights, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the human-rights-treaty bodies. We are convinced that the only measures for reform of the United Nations human-rights sector that are capable of yielding a positive result are those with a system-wide character which take into account the opinions of all concerned Member States and thereby enjoy the broadest support.

In that connection, the Russian Federation welcomes the attention given to this issue in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change entitled "A more secure world: our shared responsibility" (A/59/565 dated 2 December 2004), and in the report of the Secretary-General entitled "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (A/59/2005 dated 21 March 2005). We are also hoping for a constructive and thematic discussion of the problems of reform during the forthcoming millennium review summit and sixtieth session of the General Assembly.

At the same time, Russia calls for caution to be exercised on reform issues. Excessive haste could exacerbate existing problems in the human-rights sphere instead of solving them.

2. The Russian Federation believes that the Secretary-General, in his report "In larger freedom", accurately pointed to three key areas where the Organization's work at the current stage is of most significance, from the point of view of achieving the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and regarding the need to adapt the system to new challenges and threats. The Secretary-General is correct in his remarks about the interrelationship between, and the complementarity of, advances in the areas of development, the enjoyment of security and the observance of human rights, and in his remarks about politicization and confrontation in this sphere.

However, the measures proposed by the Secretary-General — particularly regarding reform of human-rights components, including the abolition of the Commission on Human Rights and the establishment, based upon it and replacing the Trusteeship Council, of the Human Rights Council — require thorough and complex research into all the consequences arising from such steps as well as broad consultations with all interested parties, with the participation of States, OHCHR and certain non-governmental organizations.

This approach is explained not by a desire to slow down the reform process but by recognition of the importance of human-rights issues, including integrating human-rights components, in all areas of United Nations work, within the framework of the reform policy announced by the Secretary-General.

3. The most important measure for reforming the human-rights sector of the United Nations, as proposed by the High-level Panel and the Secretary-General, is the idea of transforming the Commission on Human Rights into a Human Rights Council and elevating the status of the future body from a functional commission of the Economic and Social Council to a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly or a main Charter body of the United Nations.

This proposal appears to be useful and worthy of support, as is the proposal to assign the Council the status of a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. However, conferring upon the Council the status of a Charter body is not advisable, particularly because implementing that proposal would lead to an unjustified narrowing of the functions of the most representative mechanism of the Organization — the General Assembly — leaving the Third Committee with only social problems. Furthermore, when addressing the issue of a possible change in the status of the Commission on Human Rights, the full range of potential consequences of such a step needs to be analysed, including the effect on the functioning of the Economic and Social Council.

The most effective and legitimate format for the Council could be the expansion of its membership to universal membership, as proposed in the report of the High-level Panel. Human rights and freedoms are universal values, and the development of inter-State cooperation in the sphere of human rights was established as one of the main purposes of the Charter.

However, in the event of a lack of consensus on universal membership, the Russian Federation would be willing to agree to a small reduction in the composition of the new human-rights body, provisionally from the 53 in the existing Commission to between 48 and 50 in the Council. At the same time, it is important to maintain the current principle of election by a simple majority of votes through the regional groups. Attempts to agree on any additional criteria seem rather unrealistic and at variance with the established practice for elections to United Nations bodies of limited membership. The main intergovernmental human-rights body of the United Nations system should not turn into a kind of "select club".

Furthermore, the Russian Federation believes that it is unacceptable to limit the opportunity for simultaneous membership by one country in all three United Nations councils: the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Human Rights Council.

We are convinced that a standing Human Rights Council will entail significant additional financial costs and will cause organizational difficulties at the initial stage. The advisability of the future body's meeting on a weekly basis is also unclear, since it cannot be claimed that problems in the human-rights field are so acute and critical that such a schedule of meetings should be set a priori for the future body. The Russian Federation therefore favours maintaining a sessional format of work for the new institution with the possibility of calling special meetings, under a simplified procedure, to discuss current urgent issues, including those related to a worsening human-rights situation in any part of the world.

The proposal for the new human-rights body to adopt a peer-review mechanism is of some interest. However, this requires an equal, fair and universal approach to which the principle "the fewer the human-rights obligations, the fewer the responsibilities" will not apply. We must also bear in mind the objective

difficulties of a certain group of States which hamper the observance of the full range of human-rights standards according to any sort of universal "model".

4. Taking into account the need for additional intergovernmental consultations on transforming the Commission on Human Rights into a Human Rights Council, including on the status of a future human-rights body, it would be best to establish an open-ended working group of the General Assembly, whose mandate would include reaching agreement on a full range of issues relating to the Council's mandate, composition, working methods, procedure for elections and so on. At the end of its discussions, the working group should submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session for approval. The group should also avoid all categorical wording on any of those issues in the final report of the millennium review summit.

The Russian Federation maintains that the Commission on Human Rights should not be abolished until such time as all the parameters have been agreed for the functioning of a possible new main intergovernmental human-rights body. Furthermore, it is important to preserve all of the Commission's positive experience, including aspects related to the establishment of new human-rights standards and the functioning of basic special procedures. This, however, does not mean abandoning the need to improve the working methods of the special procedures.

5. The Russian Federation commends the plan of action submitted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, in May 2005, as called for by the Secretary-General. We share the concern of OHCHR about the lack of adequate resources to operate normally. Clearly, one of the first steps in that direction must be to increase the share of financing of OHCHR from the United Nations regular budget. Meanwhile, of course, the principle of zero growth in the budget must also be strictly observed.

The Secretary-General's proposal concerning the active involvement of the High Commissioner in the work of the Security Council and the proposed peacebuilding commission poses no major problems. Moreover, the Russian Federation considers that the Secretary-General himself must continue to be responsible for the implementation by the entire United Nations Secretariat of all the provisions of the resolutions of the main organs, including the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Furthermore, we believe it to be important to take measures to ensure the fullest possible implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Joint Inspection Unit on the management review of OHCHR (A/59/65-E/2004/48), especially the issue of human-resource management at OHCHR. We believe that it is unacceptable to ignore the principle of equitable geographical distribution in recruiting OHCHR staff. The Russian Federation accordingly supports the intention of the High Commissioner, Louise Arbour, to make efforts to resolve this problem.

6. The Russian Federation also supports the foregoing High-level Panel and the proposal by the Secretary-General to enhance the effectiveness of the operations of the human-rights-treaty bodies. We also consider that the problem of reforming the treaty bodies is not limited to establishing a harmonized set of guidelines for the drafting and submission of periodic reports by the States parties to the relevant international treaties.

We believe that monitoring mechanisms established in accordance with the major international human-rights treaties fill an important role in the development of common approaches to the understanding of human-rights standards.

A paradoxical situation has now arisen in which the system for submitting periodic reports works more or less adequately only because most States do not meet their obligations to submit these reports to the committees within the deadlines established under the relevant international agreements. This situation cannot be considered normal, as any system must operate not despite but by virtue of its underlying principles. There is a need to find ways of resolving this problem.

We doubt that a transition to submitting a single report to all the treaty bodies is immediately practicable. It seems that to carry out such a measure might lead to reducing the quality of the reports submitted, which is one of the conditions for constructive dialogue between States and members of the committees.

We also consider that the prospects for the proposals to introduce significant amendments to the texts of the international human-rights agreements concerning the operations and working methods of the treaty bodies themselves are gloomy, given the complex mechanism for reaching agreement on such amendments at the international level. It will sometimes be quite enough to take specific "technical" measures at the level of the committees themselves (modifying the rules of procedure of the treaty bodies, changing the scope of dialogue with State parties, more thorough recruitment of candidates for positions as expert members of the committees, and other measures) as well as at the level of OHCHR (expanding the implementation of programmes of technical assistance, conducting seminars and round tables on the issue of the operation of treaty bodies and submission of reports, among other things).

In the view of the Russian Federation, the initial measures must include the following. First, all human-rights-treaty bodies must make a transition to the submission by States of their periodic reports according to a harmonized schedule. A transition to a harmonized schedule, or at least setting four years as the minimum requirement, is a measure that makes good sense and is feasible from a legal and practical point of view. A specific period of time must elapse before States parties could carry out adequately and appropriately the concluding recommendations of a treaty body concerning the results of its consideration of a periodic report. During that period the State would have to adopt the relevant legislation and other legal regulations, which must begin to work before it could fully assess the results of the changes.

In addition, this step might also be accompanied (supplemented) by still other measures, such as a formal authorization by the committees for the States to submit all at once several combined periodic reports. This is already occurring de facto, such as in the case of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee against Torture. Furthermore, the treaty bodies must make more use of the practice of requesting interim information on issues and areas that raise the most concern on the part of the committees, including on the implementation of certain concluding observations and recommendations put forward after consideration of the relevant periodic report.

Secondly, another measure that might enhance the effectiveness and output of the human-rights-treaty bodies' activities would be the transition by all committees

to the practice of timely drafting and transmission to States parties of written questions in connection with the forthcoming consideration of the next periodic report. Timely transmission of questions by the committees to States parties might enable the States to better prepare for the forthcoming dialogue with the experts of the relevant body.

Thirdly, all committees in which such a practice is still maintained must give up the procedure of appointing country rapporteurs on the periodic report of any State. Experience has shown that in such cases the appointment of rapporteurs and co-rapporteurs allows only those members of the committee to truly become acquainted with the contents and analyse the provisions of the report submitted. The practice of appointing such experts "in charge" of the reports is at the least counterproductive and a needless waste of the limited time allocated for dialogue between the treaty body and the government delegation of the State party. Therefore, the practice should be given up.

Fourthly, all treaty bodies must take stock of the general observations and decisions on specific matters made by them (officially, the views on communications) and prepare their comments on the substantive provisions of the relevant treaties concerning specific human rights and freedoms which are still lacking. Such a step would lead to enhancing not only the practice of submitting and defending periodic reports but also significant harmonization of the legal systems of the States parties, taking into account the interpretation which human-rights-treaty bodies can give to specific rights and freedoms established in the texts of the human-rights treaties.

Fifthly, all committees should harmonize their rules of procedure and requirements for submitting periodic reports. In many State parties, including the Russian Federation, the same departments are often responsible for drafting reports on various human-rights agreements. In practice, this often means that the relevant government structures confuse the varying requirements and working methods of the treaty bodies. Therefore, such a measure would satisfy the interests of States in meeting as fully and properly as possible their obligations under the main international human-rights treaties.

Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of possible measures. In addition, carrying them out can produce the desired result — enhancing the effectiveness of international monitoring of human rights with respect to treaty bodies' activities — only if there is the corresponding fine-tuning by both the treaty bodies themselves and the States parties to the major international human-rights treaties.

We also consider it important to continue the practice of conducting informal forums of States with the involvement of committee experts for discussion of the issues of reform of the human-rights-treaty bodies. The meeting in Malbun, Liechtenstein, in May 2003 was particularly useful.

United Nations A/59/879

General Assembly

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Fifty-ninth session
Agenda item 24
Prevention of armed conflict

Letter dated 25 July 2005 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

In a letter (A/59/877) dated 24 March 2005, recently delivered to the Office of the President of the General Assembly, the Gambia and a very small number of other countries wantonly distorted the Anti-Secession Law passed by the National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Government and people strongly condemn and firmly oppose this act of brazen interference in China's internal affairs. Upon instructions of my Government, I hereby solemnly state our position as follows:

I. China's NPC has a clearly defined purpose in enacting the Anti-Secession Law, namely, to oppose and check Taiwan's secession from China by secessionists in the name of "Taiwan independence", promote peaceful national reunification, maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, preserve China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguard the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. This legislation has clearly identified the nature of the Taiwan question, codified the Chinese Government's basic guidelines on the Taiwan question as well as the major policies and important propositions on this issue that it has implemented or advanced over the years, and harmonized the principles and guidelines on the settlement of the Taiwan question in an integrated fashion. The provisions of the law give full expression to our consistent position on and proposal for the prospect of peaceful reunification, sought with utmost effort and maximum sincerity, and at the same time they demonstrate the common will of the entire Chinese people to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Facts have shown that this is a law designed to bring about peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question and achieve peaceful national reunification. It is by no means a "law on the use of force against Taiwan", still less a "mobilization order". It does not include a timetable for reunification. We have sufficient patience in developing cross-Straits relations and realizing peaceful reunification.

II. To realize the complete reunification of the country through peaceful means is the common aspiration of the entire Chinese people. For a long time, the Chinese Government has made unremitting efforts for a peaceful reunification of the

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motherland. Resolving the Taiwan question through peaceful means and realizing peaceful national reunification serves the fundamental interests of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits as well as the entire Chinese nation, and conforms to the trend of peace and development in the present-day world. This law unequivocally stipulates that "the State shall do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification". It also provides for efforts to encourage and promote personnel exchanges as well as economic and cultural interactions between the two sides, facilitate the three direct links and protect the legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots. It also provides for consultations and negotiations between the two sides of the Straits, which makes it clear that anything can be discussed as long as the one-China principle is adhered to, and so on and so forth. This will facilitate the implementation of provisions therein by government departments and relevant institutions and organizations in the interest of an all-round development of cross-Straits relations and peaceful reunification of the two sides.

III. In recent years, significant and complex changes have taken place on the island of Taiwan. The "Taiwan independence" secessionists have intensified their activities, causing serious impact on the peaceful and stable development of cross-Straits relations. This has increasingly become the biggest obstacle to the growth of cross-Straits relations as well as the biggest immediate threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits. At present, there have emerged some new positive factors in the cross-Straits relations that are helpful in checking the secessionist activities by "Taiwan independence" forces, and there have been certain signs of relaxation of tension in the Straits. Nevertheless, the "Taiwan independence" forces have not stopped their secessionist activities and the root cause for tension in cross-Straits relations has yet to be eliminated. In view of the immense destructiveness of the secessionist activities in the name of "Taiwan independence" to cross-Straits relations and the severe threat they pose to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and the Asia-Pacific region at large, the Anti-Secession Law provides for taking non-peaceful means to stop Taiwan's secession from China by the "Taiwan independence" forces. It must be pointed out here that we are willing to strive for peaceful reunification with utmost effort and maximum sincerity. Nevertheless, no sovereign State can tolerate secession. Non-peaceful means of stopping Taiwan's secession from China by the "Taiwan independence" forces will be used only as the last resort and only when our efforts for a peaceful reunification prove totally futile. We have enacted this law precisely to prevent this unfortunate situation from happening between the two sides. Therefore, the Anti-Secession Law is of great importance for opposing and checking the reckless secessionist activities in the name of "Taiwan independence", and to maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in the Taiwan Straits and the Asia-Pacific region.

IV. The Anti-Secession Law is a domestic law of China, and a defensive measure for safeguarding State sovereignty and territorial integrity and for enabling a prospect of peaceful reunification. Taiwan is part of Chinese territory and has never been a State. Though the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are not yet reunified, the status of the mainland and Taiwan belonging to one and the same China has never changed. Such is the status quo of cross-Straits relations. The Taiwan authorities have tried to change that status quo through "de jure Taiwan independence", which is what we can never tolerate. By enacting this law, we aim to maintain the status quo that both Taiwan and the mainland belong to one and the same China. We have

noticed that the overwhelming majority of countries in the world understand and support this piece of legislation. We have also noticed the responses from different quarters in Taiwan. We are not a bit surprised by the malicious attacks from the Taiwan authorities and various secessionist forces in Taiwan, because the law has a clear-cut objective, that is, to oppose and check Taiwan's secession from China by the "Taiwan independence" forces. If the Taiwan authorities do not engage in secessionist activities in the name of "Taiwan independence", as they have openly promised, then they should have no reason to fear, worry, or oppose this legislation. It is the "Taiwan independence" secessionist activities perpetrated by the Taiwan authorities that are the real source of tension in the Taiwan Straits.

V. It has been our consistent proposition that the Taiwan question be resolved through peaceful means on the basis of the one-China principle. Even if there is only a glimmer of hope for peaceful reunification, we will do our utmost to realize it. We have always stood for dialogue and negotiation between the two sides on the basis of the one-China principle. We welcome the efforts of any individual or political party in Taiwan towards the recognition of the one-China principle. We are willing to talk with any individual or political party, regardless of their past rhetoric and actions, about issues concerning development of cross-Straits relations and promotion of peaceful reunification, as long as they recognize the one-China principle and the 1992 consensus.

VI. Not long ago, Mr. Lien Chan, Chairman of the Chinese Kuomintang Party, and Mr. James Soong, Chairman of the People First Party, paid successful visits to the mainland at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Mr. Hu Jintao, General Secretary. Mr. Yu Mu-ming, Chairman of the New Party, also visited the mainland recently. General Secretary Hu held formal talks with each of them respectively, during which the two sides had a sincere, frank and in-depth exchange of views on major issues relating to cross-Straits relations and inter-party ties. As such visits may help move cross-Straits relations towards peace and stability, serve the common interests of people on both sides of the Straits and conform to the aspiration of Taiwan compatriots for peace, stability and development, they have received extensive support from people on both sides of the Straits and won full recognition by the international community.

VII. We will continue to promote the three direct links, economic cooperation and all other exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. We will exert our utmost effort to do, and do well, everything that benefits our Taiwan compatriots, cross-Straits exchanges, peace in the Taiwan Straits and peaceful reunification of the motherland. Since early this year, we have adopted a number of specific measures to help and benefit Taiwan compatriots. we have the confidence and sincerity in and patience for better communication and mutual understanding with Taiwan compatriots, a bright prospect for cross-Straits relations and mutual benefit and a win-win situation for both sides, through extensive exchanges, close cooperation and mutual accommodation.

VIII. Respect for State sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in a country's internal affairs stand as important principles of the Charter of the United Nations long cherished by all countries in the world. China has strictly followed these principles in managing its relations with other countries. What the Gambia and a very small number of other countries have done this time constitutes a violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We strongly urge

these countries to strictly abide by the above-mentioned principles, to refrain from doing anything further that may provide support to "Taiwan independence" secessionists in their attempts to split Taiwan from China, and to adopt the same position on the Taiwan question as the great majority of Member States. We highly appreciate the one-China position adopted by the United Nations and the great majority of its Member States and their support for China's cause of peaceful reunification. We are confident that we, the Chinese Government and people, will continue to enjoy understanding of and extensive support for our just cause of safeguarding State sovereignty and territorial integrity and promoting peaceful reunification of the motherland.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly under item 24 of its agenda.

(*Signed*) **Wang** Guangya
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the
People's Republic of China to the United Nations

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General Assembly

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Fifty-ninth session
Agenda items 45 and 55

Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Note verbale dated 13 July 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations, in his capacity as Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit herewith the text of the declaration adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Movement at their special meeting held in Doha, Qatar, on 13 June 2005 (see annex).

The Permanent Representative of Malaysia would be grateful if the Secretary-General of the United Nations would have the text of the present note verbale and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 45 and 55.

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Annex to the note verbale dated 13 July 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration

1. The Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) under the Chairmanship of the Honourable Syed Hamid Albar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia met in Doha, State of Qatar, on 13 June 2005 at the sidelines of the Second South Summit. They reviewed the preparations of NAM for the forthcoming High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly which would be held in New York from 14 to 16 September 2005.

2. The Ministers reaffirmed the continued validity of the decisions of the XIII Conference of Heads of State or Government of NAM held in Kuala Lumpur from 24 to 25 February 2003, the Annual Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NAM held in New York on 26 September 2003, the XIV Ministerial Conference of NAM held in Durban from 18 to 19 August 2004, the Annual Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NAM held in New York on 29 September 2004, and the Ministerial Meeting of NAM on the Advancement of Women held in Putrajaya from 9 to 10 May 2005.

3. The Ministers recalled General Assembly Resolutions 58/291 of 17 May 2004 and 59/145 of 13 January 2005 which have set out the objective of the High-Level Plenary Meeting to undertake a comprehensive review of the progress made in the fulfilment of all the commitments contained in the Millennium Declaration, and of the progress made in the integrated and coordinated implementation of the outcomes and commitments of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields. In this context, they reaffirmed the importance of all the outcomes of major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic and social fields, and noted that the full implementation of all internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, would be an important step in addressing the urgent needs of developing countries.

4. The Ministers considered the High-Level Plenary Meeting to be of historic significance and stressed that its outcome should provide a proper balance on all questions, in particular the balance among questions relating to development and social advancement, peace and security, and rule of law and human rights. They emphasized that any new measures concerning the United Nations and its reform should be decided by Member States through an intergovernmental process. They maintained that while reform of the United Nations is an ongoing process, the High-Level Plenary Meeting would provide an opportunity for Member States to reform the United Nations to enable it to respond to the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century.

5. The Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the efforts and work undertaken by the Non-Aligned Movement through the Co-ordinating Bureau and the Ad Hoc and subsidiary Working Groups in New York in presenting and expressing the Movement's positions, comments and ideas in a comprehensive manner on the observations and recommendations contained in the Report of the Secretary-General entitled "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (A/59/2005) and the Report of the High-Level

Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change entitled "A more secure world: our shared responsibility" (A/59/565). The Ministers endorsed and reaffirmed the positions, comments and ideas of NAM on various issues that have been conveyed to the President of the 59th Session of the General Assembly and requested the Co-ordinating Bureau to continue to advance the interests and priorities of the Movement during the period leading to the High-Level Plenary Meeting.

6. The Ministers noted with appreciation the preparatory work for the High-Level Plenary Meeting that has been carried out and is still continuing under the leadership of the President of the 59th Session of the General Assembly. They urged the President of the General Assembly to continue with his approach and commitment towards ensuring that the preparatory process for the High-Level Plenary Meeting remains inclusive, open-ended and transparent in order to allow for the interests and priorities of Member States to be taken into account.

7. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to multilateralism, the importance of the promotion and strengthening of the multilateral process, and the need to address international challenges and problems by strictly adhering to the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law. They also stressed the centrality and central role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and the strengthening of international cooperation as reaffirmed by the General Assembly in its Resolution 58/317 of 5 August 2004. They expressed their rejection of unilateralism, which could lead to the erosion and violation of international law, to the use and threat of use of force and to pressure and coercion, including unilateral sanctions, by certain countries as a means to achieving their policy objectives.

8. The Ministers, recalling the commitment to strengthening multilateralism expressed in General Assembly Resolution 58/317, called for evolving common perceptions and agreed approaches to address both the new and existing threats to international peace and security. In this regard, they underscored the need for the process of United Nations reform to take place in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. They also emphasized that all reforms within the United Nations system, including institutional reforms, should promote greater democracy, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and accountability.

9. The Ministers reiterated that the United Nations Charter provides a balance among the purposes and principles of the United Nations that cover all the pertinent issues, including economic and social development, peace and security, as well as rule of law and human rights, and the Millennium Declaration provides the twenty-first century perspective of that balance. They noted the interconnectedness of the threats faced by all countries and that these threats could be addressed by acting at a sufficiently early stage with the full range of available peaceful means. They affirmed that the leaders of Member States should pledge concerted action against the whole range of threats to international peace and security, including emerging threats, in order to provide effective collective security in the twenty-first century.

10. The Ministers, noting the interconnectedness between peace and security and development, emphasized that any effort to transform the United Nations into an effective instrument for preventing conflict should take into account the need for balance and comprehensiveness, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, in order to enhance conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding strategies with the aim of achieving sustainable development. They expressed the

view that it would be important for Member States of the United Nations to develop common perceptions and agreed approaches to address existing, new and emerging threats to international peace and security as well as the root causes of conflict. In this context, they were convinced that all the principal organs of the United Nations–the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council–have a role in evolving and implementing a more effective collective security system, and that such common perceptions and approaches to collective security would only be legitimate if they are developed in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and by all Member States acting together. They expressed the view that the active participation of each and every organ of the United Nations is crucial, acting both in the exercise of its various mandates and within the competencies assigned to each one by the Charter, without upsetting the balance of powers as established by the Charter.

11. The Ministers welcomed the idea of establishing a Peacebuilding Commission. This notwithstanding, they reiterated that, without prejudice to the competence and respective roles of other principal organs of the United Nations in post-conflict peacebuilding activities, the General Assembly must have the primary role in the establishment and the formulation of the mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission and in the formulation and implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding policies and activities.

12. The Ministers stressed that, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, Member States should further advance the principles of the non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes. In addition, they expressed the view that the promotion of a culture of peace, dialogue among civilizations and inter-religious cooperation are some of the significant measures and approaches that could contribute towards international peace, security and harmony. They also stressed that the use of force must not be considered as the only instrument to achieve and maintain international peace and security, and, if necessary, force should be used only as a measure of last resort in accordance with the Charter.

13. The Ministers affirmed that the United Nations Charter contains sufficient provisions regarding the use of force to maintain international peace and security, and stressed that achieving this goal, including by the Security Council, should be done in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. They expressed concern over the increasing resort by the Security Council to Chapter VII of the Charter as an umbrella for addressing issues that do not necessarily pose a threat to international peace and security, and maintained that the Security Council should fully utilize the provisions of other relevant Chapters, where appropriate, including Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter.

14. The Ministers affirmed the view that the Security Council need not adopt a resolution that would set out the principles for the use of force, and that the Security Council should not express through such a resolution its intention to be guided by such principles when deciding to authorize or mandate the use of force.

15. The Ministers recalled General Assembly Resolution 58/317 and stressed the continued applicability and validity of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the United Nations Charter, annexed to General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.

16. The Ministers emphasized that Article 51 of the Charter is restrictive and recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations", and that this Article should not be re-written or re-interpreted. They noted that this is supported by the practice of the United Nations and is in accordance with international law pronounced by the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, concerning this question.

17. The Ministers stressed the deep concern of the Movement over the intention of a group of States to unilaterally re-interpret the existing legal instruments, in accordance with their own views and interests, and re-emphasized that Member States must maintain the integrity of international legal instruments.

18. The Ministers reaffirmed the commitment of the Non-Aligned Movement to the United Nations Charter and underscored the need to preserve and promote its principles and purposes, including the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. In this regard, they reiterated the rejection by the Movement of the so-called "right" of humanitarian intervention, which has no basis either in the Charter or in international law, and requested the Co-ordinating Bureau in New York to continue to be seized with this issue as well as other related matters in accordance with the principled position of the Movement. They also observed similarities between the new expression "responsibility to protect" and "humanitarian intervention" and requested the Co-ordinating Bureau to carefully study and consider the expression "responsibility to protect" and its implications on the basis of the principles of non-interference and non-intervention as well as the respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty of States, bearing in mind the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and international humanitarian law.

19. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of achieving the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction globally, in particular nuclear weapons, which pose the greatest danger to mankind and the survival of civilizations. They recalled paragraph 9 of the Millennium Declaration wherein the leaders of Member States of the United Nations have resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers. They reaffirmed the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and further reaffirmed that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament. In this regard, they reiterated their call for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East which would contribute to the aims and objectives of the Middle East Peace Process.

20. The Ministers of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) acknowledged the efforts and work undertaken by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT during the Seventh Review Conference of the Parties of the NPT, which was held in New York from 2 to 27 May 2005, and noted that the Group had acted in good faith and in a constructive, flexible and consistent manner to advance its long-established and principled positions towards strengthening the NPT regime. They expressed their disappointment over the inability of the Review Conference to reach consensus on the

substantive questions surrounding the three pillars of the NPT. In this context, they noted the unwillingness by some States, including certain nuclear-weapon States, to honour their previous obligations and commitments in the fields of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, in particular those agreed by consensus during the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the NPT. This notwithstanding, they remained committed to the NPT and maintained that it continues to have an important cornerstone status in the global disarmament and non-proliferation framework. They continued to have faith in the NPT regime and its review process through the Review Conferences and expressed the view that, in looking ahead, States Parties should begin considering about what needs to be done and accomplished from now until the next Review Conference in 2010. They recognised that in general the issues related to the NPT would be addressed in the conferences and meetings of its States Parties.

21. The Ministers remained deeply concerned over the illicit transfer, manufacture and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world, especially in Africa. In this regard, they emphasised that there is a need to ensure that the supply of small arms and light weapons is limited only to Governments or to entities duly authorised by Governments and to implement legal restrictions on the unrestricted trade in and ownership of small arms and light weapons. They also emphasised the importance of early and full implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action concerning Small Arms and Light Weapons. They continued to deplore the use, in contravention of international humanitarian law, of anti-personnel mines in conflict situations aimed at maiming, killing and terrorising innocent civilians.

22. The Ministers reiterated the positions of NAM regarding international terrorism as contained in the Final Documents of the XIII Conference of Heads of State or Government of NAM in Kuala Lumpur in February 2003 and the XIV Ministerial Conference of NAM in Durban in August 2004, which have been conveyed during the process of consultations convened by the President of the 59th Session of the General Assembly in the context of preparations for the High-Level Plenary Meeting.

23. The Ministers acknowledged the role of the Secretary-General's "good offices" in helping to resolve conflicts peacefully. They expressed the view that the General Assembly should study the proposal by the Secretary-General in paragraph 108 of his Report (A/59/2005) about the need for Member States to allocate additional resources for his good offices functions, bearing in mind the limited financial capacity of developing countries and, preferably, within existing resources of the United Nations.

24. The Ministers expressed their appreciation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his continuing efforts to organize the annual multilateral treaty event in conjunction with the General Assembly sessions. They have taken note of the focus of this year's event on the 32 multilateral treaties relating to the protection of civilians. They expressed the view that achieving the objective of such treaty events, including the ratification and implementation of the treaties by Member States, would be contingent upon the national interest, priorities and capacity as well as constitutional and legislative requirements of Member States.

25. The Ministers emphasized the need for a renewal of commitment by the international community to uphold and defend the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law as well as the means envisaged in the Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this

regard, they encouraged the Security Council to make greater use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, as a source of advisory opinions and interpretation of relevant norms of international law and reaffirmed that further progress is necessary to achieve full respect for international law and the ICJ. They reiterated the support of the Movement to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on two important questions, namely on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons of 1996 and on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of 2004.

26. The Ministers reaffirmed that democracy, development and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and is based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. They affirmed that while all democracies share common features there is no one model of democracy. The Ministers recalled the pledge by the leaders of Member States of the United Nations, as contained in the Millennium Declaration, to strengthen their countries' capacity to implement the principles and practices of democracy. They recognized the important role played by the United Nations in the promotion and strengthening of democratic practices in Member States that have sought legal, technical and financial assistance in order to strengthen their capacity to implement the principles and practices of democracy. While recognizing that the promotion of democracy is important at the national level, they expressed the resolve of the Movement to make every effort to promote the democratisation of the system of international governance in order to increase the participation of developing countries in international decision-making.

27. The Ministers reaffirmed the significant importance attached by the Movement to the promotion and protection of human rights and commitment to fulfil obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance and protection of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the United Nations Charter, other instruments relating to human rights and international law. They also reaffirmed that all human rights, in particular the Right to Development, are universal, inalienable, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. They further reaffirmed that human rights issues must be addressed within the global context through a constructive, dialogue-based approach, in a fair and equal manner, with objectivity, respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, impartiality, non-selectivity and transparency as the guiding principles, taking into account the political, historical, social, religious and cultural characteristics of each countries.

28. The Ministers stressed that the proposal to increase the resources of the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (HCHR) would need to be carefully studied. In this regard, they expressed concern over the non-representation and under-representation of several Member States, especially developing countries and countries with economies in transition, in the staffing of the Office of the HCHR as well as in the whole Secretariat of the Office of the HCHR. They maintained that that the High Commissioner should be reporting to the General Assembly, which is a universal body of the United Nations, on matters relating to human rights, and in cases of breaches of international peace and security, which leads to gross and serious violations of human rights such as crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide, the Security Council may invite the High Commissioner to report on these violations.

29. The Ministers reaffirmed the Movement's general principles and positions on reform of the United Nations, as follows:-

- UN reform must be comprehensive, inclusive, balanced and pursued in an effective manner. It should fully respect the political nature of the Organization as well as its intergovernmental, universal and democratic character.
- UN reform should be aimed at strengthening the role of the Organization as the pre-eminent and indispensable forum for addressing critical and complex global issues, including the peaceful resolution of disputes, based on dialogue, cooperation and consensus-building amongst nations.
- UN reform should focus on strengthening the role of the Organization in promoting international cooperation for development and in implementing the internationally-agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, through enhanced mechanisms, adequate resources and effective follow-up activities, as well as in the maintenance of international peace and security, taking into account that the Charter clearly provides a role for each of the principal organs.
- UN reform should include strengthening and revitalization of the principal organs, namely the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as reform of the Security Council, and other relevant UN bodies.
- The revitalization of the work of the General Assembly is part of the comprehensive reform of the Organization, which is a dynamic and ongoing process. Any reform process should lead to the strengthening of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the UN, and restoring and enhancing its role, including in the maintenance of international peace and security as provided for in the Charter, through the strengthening of its relationship and coordination with other organs, in particular the Security Council.
- Any UN reform proposal should also address systemic issues and requirement for additional human and financial resources that may arise as a result.

30. The Ministers observed the tendency by some to equate United Nations reform with greater empowerment of the Security Council. They emphasised the need to keep the balance among the functions, competencies and responsibilities of the principal organs of the United Nations.

31. The Ministers endorsed and reiterated the Movement's positions concerning efforts to strengthen the United Nations, including the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly, reform of the Security Council, reform of the Economic and Social Council, reform of the Secretariat, and the proposed establishment of the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, which have been conveyed during the process of consultations convened by the President of the 59th Session of the General Assembly in the context of preparations for the High-Level Plenary Meeting.

32. The Ministers reiterated the Movement's commitment to be engaged constructively in the continuing preparatory process for the High-Level Plenary Meeting and in this context, instructed their delegations to participate actively in the upcoming consultations and negotiations on the draft outcome document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting submitted by the President of the 59th Session of the General Assembly.

33. The Ministers expressed their heartfelt appreciation and gratitude to His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the Emir of the State of Qatar, His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al-Thani, the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, the Government and the people of the State of Qatar for the generous hospitality and courtesies as well as the excellent facilities and services which have greatly contributed to the success of the Special Meeting. They acknowledged the strong commitment of the State of Qatar to the efforts of the Non-Aligned Movement towards the achievement of its aims and objectives, in keeping with the spirit of unity and solidarity prevailing in the Movement and the collective desire to sustain the process of the revitalisation of the Movement.

Doha, 13 June 2005

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Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Note verbale dated 20 July 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of Costa Rica presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to enclose a document, entitled "Elections by fatigue: some considerations on the proposed election procedure for new permanent members of the Security Council", prepared by the Government of Costa Rica as a contribution to the current efforts to reform and revitalize the Security Council and the United Nations at large.

The Permanent Mission of Costa Rica would like to request that the document enclosed be distributed as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 53 and 55.

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Annex to the note verbale dated 20 July 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Elections by fatigue: some considerations on the proposed election procedure for new permanent members of the Security Council

As noted by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, "the effectiveness of the global collective security system, as with any other legal order, depends ultimately not only on the legality of decisions but also on the common perception of their legitimacy ...". In this context, the overriding goal of all efforts to reform the Security Council must be to make the Council more legitimate and, therefore, more effective. Therefore, when we consider proposals for the expansion of the Security Council and, in particular, proposals for the possible creation of new permanent members (for example A/59/L.64 and A/59/L.67), we must examine whether those initiatives would enhance the legitimacy of the Security Council.

If there were a broad agreement to enlarge the Security Council in the category of permanent members, the selection of the new permanent members would not be contentious: their names would arise naturally from the general and overwhelming agreement that one or more States are qualified to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security to such a high degree that their continuous presence in the Council is not only desirable but indispensable. Conversely, a contentious electoral process, with aggressive and even negative campaigning, lobbying and secret bilateral deals, could jeopardize the legitimacy of the Council as a whole and weaken the collective security mechanism on which we all depend.

The legitimacy of new permanent members would be open to even more question if they are elected after many rounds of voting, increasing their support slowly, round by round, not because of their inherent merits but due to the exhaustion of the General Assembly. This scenario, the election of new permanent members by fatigue, is, in fact, quite likely to occur under some of the proposals currently under consideration, that foresee an open-ended electoral process — a process without any limits on the maximum number of rounds permissible.

Statistical evidence on the elections to fill non-permanent seats in the Security Council throws some light on the proposed procedure to select new permanent members, even though the stakes in those elections are much lower. The evidence shows, specifically, that elections by fatigue are in fact quite common. Out of the 60 elections for non-permanent seats held in the period from 1946 to 2004, in only 28 elections were the available seats filled in the first round of voting. In the other 32 elections, the General Assembly held an average of 13 rounds of votes. Some elections were particularly dramatic. The 1955 election required 36 rounds of votes and took over two months, from 14 October to 20 December. The 1959 election required 52 rounds of voting, scattered from 12 October to 12 December. These two elections concluded when the candidates agreed to share the mandate, so that each one occupied the non-permanent seat for one year.[a] The 1979 election saw an

[a] In commenting on a "gentlemen's agreement" to share the mandate in the Security Council, Mr. Mishra, Permanent Representative of India, stressed that such an agreement "is a private arrangement between two delegations and that it cannot, under the Charter, bind the Assembly" (General Assembly, 1245th meeting, eighteenth session, 1 November 1963).

unprecedented 155 rounds of voting. The General Assembly was forced to continue the election the following year, after the date at which the new member was supposed to have taken its seat in the Council. Eventually, both candidates withdrew in favour of a third State, which was endorsed to occupy the seat in question (see table attached).

Elections by fatigue can take a heavy toll on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Security Council. Commenting on this situation, and to cite an earlier example, Sir Pierson Dixon, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland said at the eleventh session of the General Assembly:

> "We all remember with discomfort the protracted difficulties with which we met at the tenth session in filling one of the non-permanent seats on the Security Council. That was an unpleasant experience and led to much criticism of the United Nations. (...) Of course we do not want anything of the kind to happen again. However, I believe that it probably will unless some remedial action is taken. And conceivably the difficulties that have in the past applied to only one of the non-permanent seats might spill over to others of them. That is a very disquieting prospect." (General Assembly, 622nd meeting, eleventh session, 17 December 1956)

The discomfort and disquieting prospects mentioned by Sir Pierson would be even greater if what it is at stake in a protracted election is the unusual privilege of occupying a permanent seat in the Security Council.

Furthermore, it should be noted that, under the proposed rules for the election of new permanent members, a protracted electoral process might occur even if there is only one candidate running for each available seat. Even if they do not face any opposition, the candidates might, for one reason or another, be unable to obtain the required majority of two thirds of the Member States of the United Nations.

The open-ended character of the electoral process creates another problem: that there is no pre-established workable agreement that could serve to end an otherwise protracted electoral process. Unlike the elections for non-permanent seats, in which the candidates may agree to share the mandate, taking one year each, a permanent seat, by its nature, cannot be divided, even if candidates wish to do so. Moreover, the candidates cannot withdraw in favour of a consensus third State because, as contemplated in some proposals, only those States that submit their candidature at the start of the process are eligible. Under these conditions, the General Assembly might be faced with a difficult choice: either to elect by fatigue a State that most would prefer not to see as a permanent member, thus eroding the legitimacy of the Security Council as a whole, or leaving empty one of the new permanent seats, thus calling into question the validity of the whole exercise.

Costa Rica is convinced that the threat of elections by fatigue to the legitimacy of an enlarged Security Council is of such magnitude that it is indispensable to adopt proper safeguards to ensure that, if the General Assembly decides to create new permanent members, there would be a minimum number of rounds and that only those States that enjoy the support of the overwhelming majority of Member States would ever become permanent members.

In raising the need for proper safeguards, Costa Rica is not endorsing the proposed enlargement of the Security Council in the permanent member category, but simply seeking to ensure that the proposed election procedure be as credible and as legitimate as possible.

Enclosure

Elections for non-permanent members of the Security Council: a comprehensive review 1946-2004

The following table contains 3 columns: the first column chronologically orders the elections for non-permanent members by General Assembly session and meeting [General Assembly sessions are identified in bold type as UNGA followed by the respective number; meetings are identified by the corresponding number and date]. The second column contains the total number of rounds of voting for each election and details each election round, with the number of valid votes, the number of abstentions and an indication as to whether the round of voting was restricted or unrestricted. The third column lists the results by number of votes received, with those Member States that receive the required two-thirds majority or more identified in bold type. In some cases, additional information is offered, such as withdrawal of candidatures, agreements between candidates to share the two-year term and other information that was considered relevant.

Elections for non-permanent members of the Security Council: a comprehensive review 1946-2004

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1946 UNGA1	**4 Rounds**	
4th 12-01-46	Round 1: 51 votes	**Brazil** 47, **Egypt** 45, **Mexico** 45, **Poland** 39, **Netherlands** 37, Canada 33, Australia 28, Iran 6, Norway 5, Czechoslovakia 4, Denmark 2, Belgium 1, Ethiopia 1, Greece 1, Luxembourg 1, New Zealand 1, Turkey 1, Yugoslavia 1
	Round 2: 51 votes, restricted	Australia 27, Canada 23
5th 12-01-46	Round 3: 51 votes, restricted	Australia 28, Canada 23 [withdrew]
	Round 4: 51 votes, restricted	**Australia** 46, Canada 3
1946 UNGA1	**1 Round**	
48th 19-11-46	Round 1: 54 votes	**Colombia** 51, **Syria** 45, **Belgium** 43, India 13, Norway 4, Canada 1, Cuba 1, Greece 1, Turkey 1
1947 UNGA2	**12 Rounds**	
92nd 30-09-47	Round 1: 57 votes	**Argentina** 41, **Canada** 41, Ukrainian SSR 33, India 29, Czechoslovakia 8, Uruguay 8, Chile 2, Ethiopia 1, Greece 1, Guatemala 1, Philippines 1
	Round 2: 56 votes, restricted	Ukrainian SSR 29, India 24
93rd 30-09-47	Round 3: 56 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Ukrainian SSR 29, India 25
	Round 4: 57 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Ukrainian SSR 30, India 25
	Round 5: 57 votes, restricted	Ukrainian SSR 33, India 23
	Round 6: 57 votes, unrestricted	Ukrainian SSR 34, India 22
	Round 7: 57 votes, unrestricted	Ukrainian SSR 33, India 23
94th 01-10-47	Round 8: 56 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Ukrainian SSR 31, India 23
	Round 9: 57 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Ukrainian SSR 32, India 24
96th 20-10-47	Round 10: 55 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Ukrainian SSR 29, India 24
	Round 11: 57 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Ukrainian SSR 30, India 25 [withdrew]
109th 13-11-47	Round 12: 54 votes, 15 abstentions, unrestricted	**Ukrainian SSR** 35, India 2
1948 UNGA3	**4 Rounds**	
149th 08-10-48	Round 1: 53 votes	**Cuba** 52, **Norway** 44, Egypt 30, Turkey 23, Denmark 3, Pakistan 2, New Zealand 1, Siam 1, Sweden 1
	Round 2: 56 votes, restricted	Egypt 34, Turkey 20
	Round 3: 56 votes, restricted	Egypt 36, Turkey 19
	Round 4: 57 votes, restricted	**Egypt** 38, Turkey 19
1949 UNGA4	**2 Rounds**	
231st 20-10-49	Round 1: 58 votes	**Ecuador** 57, **India** 56, Yugoslavia 37, Czechoslovakia 20, Afghanistan 1, Philippines 1
	Round 2: 59 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	**Yugoslavia** 39, Czechoslovakia 19

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1950 UNGA5	**14 Rounds**	
290e 29-09-50	Round 1: 59 votes	**Brazil** 57, **Netherlands** 47, Turkey 32, Lebanon 30, Sweden 2, Yemen 2, **Bolivia 1, Burma 1**
	Round 2: 60 votes, restricted	Turkey 34, Lebanon 26
	Round 3: 60 votes, restricted	Turkey 36, Lebanon 24
	Round 4: 60 votes, restricted	Turkey 35, Lebanon 25
	Round 5: 60 votes, unrestricted	Turkey 36, Lebanon 24
	Round 6: 60 votes, unrestricted	Turkey 33, Lebanon 26
	Round 7: 60 votes, unrestricted	Turkey 35, Lebanon 35
	Round 8: 60 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Turkey 35, Lebanon 24
291e 29-09-50	Round 9: 58 votes, restricted	Turkey 33, Lebanon 25
	Round 10: 60 votes, restricted	Turkey 36, Lebanon 24
	Round 11: 60 votes, unrestricted	Turkey 35, Lebanon 25
	Round 12: 60 votes, unrestricted	Turkey 36, Lebanon 24
294e 07-10-50	Round 13: 60 votes, unrestricted	Turkey 33, Lebanon 27 [withdrew]
	Round 14: 60 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	**Turkey** 53, Lebanon 4
1951 UNGA6	**12 Rounds**	
349e 06-12-51	Round 1: 60 votes	**Chile** 57, **Pakistan** 55, Greece 30, Argentina 1, Australia 1, Byelorussian SSR 26, Colombia 1, El Salvador 1, Philippines 1
	Round 2: 60 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Greece 30, Byelorussian SSR 29
	Round 3: 60 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Greece 30, Byelorussian SSR 29
	Round 4: 60 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Byelorussian SSR 30, Greece 29
	Round 5: 60 votes, unrestricted	Byelorussian SSR 32, Greece 24, Philippines 3, El Salvador 1
	Round 6: 60 votes, unrestricted	Byelorussian SSR 31, Greece 25, Philippines 3, El Salvador 1
	Round 7: 60 votes, unrestricted	Byelorussian SSR 33, Greece 24, Philippines 3
	Round 8: 60 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Byelorussian SSR 32, Greece 27
356e 20-12-51	Round 9: 58 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Greece 36, Byelorussian SSR 20
	Round 10: 59 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Greece 35, Byelorussian SSR 20, Sweden 2, Burma 1
	Round 11: 59 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Greece 38, Byelorussian SSR 17, Sweden 2, Burma 1
	Round 12: 59 votes, 4 abstentions, restricted	**Greece** 39, Byelorussian SSR 16
1952 UNGA7	1 Round	
389e 25-10-52	Round 1: 60 votes	**Colombia** 58, **Lebanon** 58, **Denmark** 56
1953 UNGA8	**8 Rounds**	
450e 05-10-53	Round 1: 60 votes, 1 abstention	**Brazil** 56, **New Zealand** 48, Turkey 32, Poland 18, Philippines 17, Czechoslovakia 2, Ecuador 2, Mexico 1
	Round 2: 60 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Turkey 38, Poland 20

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1953 UNGA8	Round 3: 60 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Turkey 37, Poland 22
continued	Round 4: 60 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Turkey 36, Poland 23
	Round 5: 60 votes, unrestricted	Turkey 31, Poland 18, Philippines 11
	Round 6: 60 votes, unrestricted	Turkey 33, Poland 16, Philippines 11
	Round 7: 60 votes, unrestricted	Turkey 35, Poland 15, Philippines 10
	Round 8: 60 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	**Turkey** 40, Poland 19
1954 UNGA9	**1 Round**	
492nd 06-10-54	Round 1: 58 votes	**Iran** 56, **Peru** 56, **Belgium** 52, Burma 1, Haiti 1, India 1, Panama 1
1955 UNGA10	**36 Rounds**	
534th 14-10-55	Round 1: 59 votes, 1 abstention	**Cuba** 53, **Australia** 42, Poland 34, Philippines 33, Indonesia 2, Thailand 2, South Africa 1, Yugoslavia 1
	Round 2: 59 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Philippines 35, Poland 23
	Round 3: 59 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Philippines 38, Poland 20
	Round 4: 59 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Philippines 36, Poland 20
	Round 5: 59 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Philippines 30, Yugoslavia 25, Poland 1, Yemen 1
	Round 6: 59 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Philippines 29, Yugoslavia 28
535th 19-10-55	Round 7: 59 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Philippines 31, Yugoslavia 27
	Round 8: 59 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Philippines 30, Yugoslavia 28
	Round 9: 59 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Philippines 31, Yugoslavia 27
538th 27-10-55	Round 10: 57 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Philippines 30, Yugoslavia 24
	Round 11: 58 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Philippines 30, Yugoslavia 25, India 1
	Round 12: 59 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Philippines 32, Yugoslavia 24, India 2
540th 08-11-55	Round 13: 59 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Philippines 30, Yugoslavia 28
	Round 14: 59 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Philippines 31, Yugoslavia 27
	Round 15: 59 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Philippines 31, Yugoslavia 26
	Round 16: 59 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Philippines 29, Yugoslavia 27
	Round 17: 59 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Philippines 27, Yugoslavia 26, India 1, Uruguay 1, Yemen 1
	Round 18: 59 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Philippines 29, Yugoslavia 26, Bolivia 1, Burma 1, Liberia 1
	Round 19: 59 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Yugoslavia 26, Philippines 25, Burma 2, Bolivia 1, Liberia 1
	Round 20: 59 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Philippines 29, Yugoslavia 27
	Round 21: 59 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Philippines 30, Yugoslavia 27
551st 06-12-55	Round 22: 58 votes, restricted	Philippines 30, Yugoslavia 28
	Round 23: 59 votes, unrestricted	Philippines 30, Yugoslavia 27, Greece 1, Czechoslovakia 1
	Round 24: 59 votes, unrestricted	Philippines 31, Yugoslavia 28
	Round 25: 59 votes, unrestricted	Philippines 32, Yugoslavia 25, Iceland 1, Sweden 1
	Round 26: 59 votes, restricted	Philippines 33, Yugoslavia 26

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1955 UNGA10	Round 27: 59 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Philippines 32, Yugoslavia 26
continued	Round 28: 59 votes, restricted	Philippines 32, Yugoslavia 27
	Round 29: 59 votes, unrestricted	Philippines 29, Yugoslavia 25, Greece 1, Iceland 1, Sweden 1, Syria 1
558th 16-12-55	Round 30: 68 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Philippines 35, Yugoslavia 28, Sweden 2, Uruguay 1
	Round 31: 70 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Philippines 36, Yugoslavia 30, Sweden 2, Greece 1
	Round 32: 70 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Philippines 40, Yugoslavia 28
	Round 33: 70 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Philippines 37, Yugoslavia 32
	Round 34: 70 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Philippines 37, Yugoslavia 31
559th 16-12-55	Round 35: 69 votes, 10 abstentions, unrestricted	Yugoslavia 34, Philippines 19, Spain 2, Bulgaria 1, Italy 1, Sweden 1, Yemen 1
560th 20-12-55	Round 36: 70 votes, 13 abstentions, unrestricted	**Yugoslavia** 43, Philippines 11, Finland 1, Sweden 1 [one-year agreement between Philippines and Yugoslavia]
1956 UNGA11	**4 Rounds**	
612th 07-12-56	Round 1: 75 votes, 1 abstention	**Philippines** 51, Czechoslovakia 20, Afghanistan 1, Spain 1, Yugoslavia 1 [end of one-year term Yugoslavia]
612th 07-12-56	Round 1: 77 votes	**Colombia** 73, **Iraq** 69, Sweden 41, Spain 32, India 3, Italy 2, Brazil 1, Ireland 1, Liberia 1, Mexico 1, Norway 1, Yemen 1
	Round 2: 79 votes, restricted	Sweden 47, Spain 32
	Round 3: 77 votes, restricted	Sweden 49, Spain 28
627th 19-12-56	Round 4: 77 votes, unrestricted	**Sweden** 71, Spain 5, Italy 1
1957 UNGA12	**1 Round**	
695th 08-10-57	Round 1: 78 votes	**Panama** 74, **Canada** 72, **Japan** 55, Czechoslovakia 25, Argentina 1, Brazil 1, Chile 1, Dominican Republic 1, India 1, Italy 1, Sudan 1
1958 UNGA13	**1 Round**	
775th 08-10-58	Round 1: 79 votes	**Argentina** 78, **Italy** 76, **Tunisia** 74, Iran 2, Finland 1, Greece 1
1959 UNGA14	**52 Rounds**	
825th 12-10-59	Round 1: 80 votes	**Ecuador** 77, **Ceylon** 72, Poland 46, Turkey 36, Burma 1, Canada 1
	Round 2: 81 votes, restricted	Poland 43, Turkey 38
	Round 3: 81 votes, restricted	Poland 45, Turkey 36
	Round 4: 81 votes, unrestricted	Poland 46, Turkey 35
	Round 5: 81 votes, unrestricted	Poland 46, Turkey 34
	Round 6: 81 votes, unrestricted	Poland 46, Turkey 34, Jordan 1
	Round 7: 81 votes, restricted	Poland 48, Turkey 33
	Round 8: 81 votes, restricted	Poland 47, Turkey 34
	Round 9: 81 votes, restricted	Poland 48, Turkey 33
	Round 10: 81 votes, unrestricted	Poland 47, Turkey 34

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1959 UNGA14	Round 11: 80 votes, unrestricted	Poland 45, Turkey 35
continued	Round 12: 81 votes, unrestricted	Poland 46, Turkey 35
826th 12-10-59	Round 13: 81 votes, restricted	Poland 46, Turkey 34
827th 13-10-59	Round 14: 81 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Poland 43, Turkey 36
	Round 15: 80 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Poland 44, Turkey 34
	Round 16: 82 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Poland 41, Turkey 35, Yugoslavia 2, Sudan 1
	Round 17: 82 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Poland 40, Turkey 36, Yugoslavia 3, Libya 1, Sudan 1
	Round 18: 82 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Poland 38, Turkey 35, Yugoslavia 7
	Round 19: 82 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Poland 43, Turkey 37
	Round 20: 81 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Poland 44, Turkey 35
	Round 21: 82 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Poland 44, Turkey 36
	Round 22: 82 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Poland 42, Turkey 35, Yugoslavia 4
	Round 23: 82 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Poland 41, Turkey 34, Yugoslavia 6
	Round 24: 81 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Poland 38, Turkey 35, Yugoslavia 7
	Round 25: 82 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Poland 43, Turkey 36
830th 19-10-59	Round 26: 80 votes, restricted	Poland 44, Turkey 35
	Round 27: 81 votes, restricted	Poland 41, Turkey 40
	Round 28: 82 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Poland 41, Turkey 40
	Round 29: 81 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Turkey 41, Poland 39
	Round 30: 82 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Poland 41, Turkey 40
	Round 31: 82 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Turkey 42, Poland 39
835th 08-11-59	Round 32: 75 votes, restricted	Poland 39, Turkey 36
	Round 33: 79 votes, restricted	Turkey 41, Poland 38
	Round 34: 80 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Turkey 43, Poland 36
	Round 35: 81 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Poland 40, Turkey 40
	Round 36: 81 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Poland 40, Turkey 39, 1 Finland
	Round 37: 81 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Turkey 42, Poland 38
839th 17-11-59	Round 38: 81 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Poland 42, Turkey 38
	Round 39: 82 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Poland 42, Turkey 39
	Round 40: 82 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Poland 39, Turkey 39, Luxembourg 2, Ireland 1
	Round 41: 82 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Poland 40, Turkey 36, Ghana 1, Iceland 1, Ireland 1, Luxembourg 1, Ukrainian SSR 1
	Round 42: 82 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Poland 40, Turkey 39, Greece 1
	Round 43: 82 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Poland 42, Turkey 39
845th 01-12-59	Round 44: 77 votes, restricted	Poland 40, Turkey 37
	Round 45: 79 votes, restricted	Turkey 40, Poland 39
	Round 46: 80 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Poland 40, Turkey 37
	Round 47: 82 votes, unrestricted	Poland 42, Turkey 40

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1959 UNGA14	Round 48: 82 votes, unrestricted	Poland 41, Turkey 41
continued	Round 49: 81 votes, restricted	Turkey 42, Poland 39
853rd 11-12-59	Round 50: 78 votes, restricted	Poland 41, Turkey 37
	Round 51: 78 votes, restricted	Poland 41, Turkey 37
857th 12-12-59	Round 52: 80 votes, 4 abstentions, unrestricted	**Poland** 71, Turkey 3, Greece 1, Yemen 1 [one-year agreement between Poland and Turkey]
1960 UNGA15	14 Rounds	
941st 09-12-60	Round 1: 85 votes, 3 abstentions	**Turkey** 74, Liberia 4, Poland 2, United Arab Republic 1 [end of one-year term of Poland]
941st 09-12-60	Round 1: 94 votes, 1 abstention	**Chile** 74, **United Arab Republic** 74, Portugal 50, Liberia 32, Ethiopia 6, Ghana 5, Jordan 3, Nigeria 3, Cuba 2, Cote d'Ivoire 2, Panama 2, Cameroon 1, Canada 1, Dominican Republic 1, El Salvador 1, Guinea 1, Morocco 1, Norway 1, Saudi Arabia 1, Venezuela 1
	Round 2: 98 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Portugal 49, Liberia 47
	Round 3: 99 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Liberia 51, Portugal 46
	Round 4: 99 votes, unrestricted	Liberia 50, Portugal 42, Burma 1, Ghana 1, Netherlands 1, Norway 1, Spain 1, Sweden 1
	Round 5: 99 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Liberia 53, Portugal 39, Austria 2, Netherlands 1, Nigeria 1, Norway 1, Sweden 1
	Round 6: 98 votes, unrestricted	Liberia 54, Portugal 39, Austria 4, Norway 1
	Round 7: 98 votes, 5 abstentions, restricted	Liberia 55, Portugal 38
950th 20-12-60	Round 8: 94 votes, 4 abstentions, restricted	Liberia 45, Portugal 43
	Round 9: 94 votes, restricted	Liberia 48, Portugal 46 [Portugal withdraws in favor of Ireland]
	Round 10: 94 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Liberia 45, Ireland 36, Portugal 7, Cyprus 3, Ghana 1, Nigeria 1
	Round 11: 94 votes, unrestricted	Liberia 48, Ireland 38, Portugal 4, Cyprus 2, Mali 1, Nigeria 1
	Round 12: 94 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Liberia 44, Ireland 40, Portugal 3, Cyprus 2, Dahomey 1, Ghana 1, Nigeria 1
	Round 13: 93 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Ireland 45, Liberia 45
	Round 14: 93 votes, 7 abstentions, unrestricted	**Liberia** 76, Ireland 5, Portugal 2, Cyprus 1, Nigeria 1 [one-year agreement between Liberia and Ireland]
1961 UNGA16	10 Rounds	
1044th 30-10-61	Round 1: 103 votes, 2 abstentions	**Ireland** 83, Romania 10, Dahomey 1, Ghana 1, Philippines 1 [end of one-year term of Liberia]
1044th 30-10-61	Round 1: 103 votes	**Venezuela** 96, **Ghana** 88, Romania 58, Philippines 47, Nigeria 3, Austria 1, India 1, Guinea 1, New Zealand 1, Netherlands 1
	Round 2: 102 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Philippines 52, Romania 49
	Round 3: 102 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Philippines 54, Romania 48
1053rd 14-11-61	Round 4: 98 votes, unrestricted	Romania 49, Philippines 47, India 1, Japan 1
	Round 5: 102 votes, unrestricted	Romania 54, Philippines 47, India 1
	Round 6: 102 votes, unrestricted	Romania 53, Philippines 48, India 1
	Round 7: 103 votes, restricted	Romania 52, Philippines 49
	Round 8: 103 votes, restricted	Romania 55, Philippines 48
	Round 9: 103 votes, restricted	Romania 53, Philippines 50
1068th 01-12-61	Round 10: 97 votes, 5 abstentions, unrestricted	**Romania** 75, Philippines 16 [one-year agreement between Philippines and Romania]

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1962 UNGA17	**2 Rounds**	
1154th 17-10-62	Round 1: 105 votes, 2 abstentions,	**Philippines** 95, Nigeria 2, Norway 2, Afghanistan 1, Romania 1 [end of one-year term of Romania]
1154th 17-10-62	Round 1: 109 votes	**Brazil** 91, **Norway** 85, Morocco 57, Nigeria 30, Iran 28, Afghanistan 5, Ethiopia 2, Burma 1, Haiti 1, Israel 1, Mauritania 1
	Round 2: 109 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	**Morocco** 73, Nigeria 35
1963 UNGA18	**12 Rounds**	
1246th 18-10-63	Round 1: 109 votes, 1 abstention	**Côte d'Ivoire** 92, **Bolivia** 86, Czechoslovakia 63, Malaysia 56, Indonesia 1
	Round 2: 109 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Czechoslovakia 55, Malaysia 52
	Round 3: 109 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Czechoslovakia 55, Malaysia 52
	Round 4: 110 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Czechoslovakia 54, Malaysia 54
	Round 5: 110 votes, unrestricted	Czechoslovakia 56, Malaysia 51, Cambodia 1, Lebanon 1
1252nd 25-10-63	Round 6: 111 votes, unrestricted	Malaysia 56, Czechslovakia 55
	Round 7: 110 votes, unrestricted	Malaysia 58, Czechoslovakia 52
	Round 8: 110 votes, restricted	Czechoslovakia 56, Malaysia 54
	Round 9: 110 votes, restricted	Czechoslovakia 56, Malaysia 54
	Round 10: 109 votes, restricted	Czechoslovakia 58, Malaysia 51
	Round 11: 110 votes, unrestricted	Czechoslovakia 56, Malaysia 53, Honduras 1
1254th 01-11-63	Round 12: 102 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	**Czechoslovakia** 89, Malaysia 10 [one-year agreement between Czechoslovakia and Malaysia]
1964 UNGA19	**2 Rounds**	
1313th 29-12-64	Round 1: Consultations by the President	**Malaysia** [end of one-year term of Czechoslovakia]
1313th 29-12-64	Round 1: Consultations by the President	**Netherlands**, **Uruguay**, Jordan, Mali
1315th 30-12-64	Round 2: Consultations by the President	**Jordan**, Mali [one-year agreement between Jordan and Mali]
1965 UNGA20	**1 Round**	
1392nd 10-12-65	Round 1: 115 votes	**Argentina** 113, **Bulgaria** 108, **Nigeria** 107, **Mali** 105, **Uganda** 102, **New Zealand** 101, **Japan** 98, Mauritania 4, Somalia 3, Ceylon 1, Ethiopia 1, Guinea 1, Liberia 1, Madagascar 1, Pakistan 1, Spain 1, Thailand 1, United Republic of Tanzania 1
1966 UNGA21	**1 Round**	
1462nd 11-11-66	Round 1: 119 votes	**Brazil** 114, **Canada** 114, **Ethiopia** 109, **Denmark** 108, **India** 82, Syria 42, Sweden 3, Italy 1, Kenya 1, Pakistan 1, Senegal 1, Somalia 1
1967 UNGA22	**1 Round**	
1595th 06-11-67	Round 1: 118 votes	**Pakistan** 118, **Senegal** 110, **Algeria** 108, **Hungary** 105, **Paraguay** 101, Romania 3, Albania 2, Tunisia 2, Uruguay 2, Chile 1, Cyprus 1, Congo 1, Congo Democratic Republic 1, Cuba 1, Dahomey 1, Ecuador 1, Madagascar 1, Malawi 1, Morocco 1, Peru 1, Yugoslavia 1

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1968 UNGA23	**1 Round**	
1709th 01-11-68	Round 1: 126 votes	Nepal 120, **Finland** 119, **Colombia** 118, **Zambia** 115, **Spain** 110, Italy 5, Cuba 1, Guinea 1, Haiti 1, Ireland 1
1969 UNGA24	**1 Round**	
1787th 20-10-69	Round 1: 126 votes	**Poland** 121, **Burundi** 118, **Sierra Leone** 117, **Nicaragua** 103, **Syria** 101, Cuba 6, Peru 3, Togo 3, Lebanon 2, Tunisia 2, Botswana 1, Brazil 1, Haiti 1, Iraq 1, Israel 1, Japan 1, Jordan 1, Kenya 1, Mali 1, Mongolia 1, Panama 1, United Arab Republic 1, Yugoslavia 1
1970 UNGA25	**1 Round**	
1868th 16-10-70	Round 1: 113 votes	**Argentina** 109, **Italy** 108, **Belgium** 101, **Somalia** 101, **Japan** 102, Democratic Republic of Congo 2, Austria 1, Burma 1, Fiji 1, Haiti 1, India 1, Luxembourg 1
1971 UNGA26	**1 Round**	
1983rd 23-11-71	Round 1: 116 votes	**Yugoslavia** 112, **Sudan** 111, **Guinea** 109, **Panama** 108, **India** 107, Peru 2, Chile 1, Ethiopia 1, Fiji 1, Israel 1, Pakistan 1, Tunisia 1
1972 UNGA27	**1 Round**	
2070th 20-10-72	Round 1: 118 votes	**Peru** 116, **Austria** 115, **Indonesia** 115, **Kenya** 112, **Australia** 109, Haiti 1, Pakistan 1
1973 UNGA*28	**1 Round**	
2153rd 15-10-73	Round 1: 125 votes	**Mauritania** 120, **Cameroon** 120, **Iraq** 116, **Byelorussian SSR** 112, **Costa Rica** 104, Cuba 5, Jamaica 3, Romania 2, Honduras 1, Iran 1, Libya 1
1974 UNGA29	**1 Round**	
2266th 11-10-74	Round 1: 129 votes	**Sweden** 127, **Italy** 125, **Guyana** 123, **Tanzania** 122, **Japan** 121, Liberia 2, Bolivia 1, Brazil 1, Congo 1, Cuba 1, Finland 1, India 1, Nigeria 1, Zambia 1
1975 UNGA30	**8 Rounds**	
2384th 20-10-75	Round 1: 140 votes	**Romania** 137, **Dahomey** 133, **Panama** 132, **Liberia** 126, India 80, Pakistan 59, Philippines 28, Cuba 2, Argentina 1, Bolivia 1, Morocco 1, Nigeria 1, Rwanda 1, Senegal 1, Sierra Leone 1, Venezuela 1, Yugoslavia 1, Zambia 1
	Round 2: 140 votes, 4 abstentions, restricted	Pakistan 76, India 59
	Round 3: 140 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Pakistan 73, India 64
	Round 4: 140 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Pakistan 78, India 59
2385th 20-10-75	Round 5: 139 votes, 1 abstentions, unrestricted	Pakistan 60, India 54, Philippines 20, Bhutan 1
	Round 6: 135 votes, 1 abstentions, unrestricted	Pakistan 72, India 38, Papua New Guinea 1
2386th 21-10-75	Round 7: 137 votes, 4 abstentions, unrestricted	Pakistan 75, India 58 [withdrew]
2387th 23-10-75	Round 8: 136 votes, 8 abstentions, restricted	**Pakistan** 131

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1976 UNGA31	**1 Round**	
40th 21-10-76	Round 1: 138 votes	**Venezuela** 136, **Mauritius** 134, **India** 132, **Canada** 126, **Federal Republic of Germany** 119, Poland 2, Austria 1, Belgium 1, Bhutan 1, Burundi 1, Chile 1, Cuba 1, Denmark 1, Greece 1, Ireland 1, Kenya 1, Luxembourg 1, Madagascar 1, Philippines 1, Portugal 1, Spain 1, Turkey 1, Yugoslavia 1
1977 UNGA32	**5 Rounds**	
93rd 24-10-77	Round 1: 145 votes, 1 abstention	**Czechoslovakia** 131, **Kuwait** 130, **Bolivia** 115, **Gabon** 109, Niger 85, Nigeria 84, Jamaica 13, Cuba 5, Argentina 1, Iraq 1, Oman 1, Poland 1, Zambia 1
	Round 2: 146 votes, restricted	Nigeria 83, Niger 62
	Round 3: 146 votes, restricted	Nigeria 89, Niger 57
	Round 4: 144 votes, 5 abstentions, restricted	Nigeria 92, Niger 49
	Round 5: 145 votes, 16 abstentions, unrestricted	**Nigeria** 96, Niger 27, Cuba 2, Angola 1, Senegal 1, Tanzania 1
1978 UNGA33	**5 Rounds**	
34th 10-11-78	Round 1: 149 votes	**Jamaica** 145, **Zambia** 144, **Norway** 118, Bangladesh 84, Portugal 84, Malta 81, Japan 65, Comoros 1, Peru 1
	Round 2: 149 votes, restricted	Bangladesh 87, Portugal 77, Malta 70, Japan 61 [withdrew]
51st 10-11-78	Round 3: 142 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	**Bangladesh** 125, Portugal 81, Malta 59, Japan 2
	Round 4: 145 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Portugal 93, Malta 51
	Round 5: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	**Portugal** 99, Malta 45
1979 UNGA34	**155 Rounds**	
47th 26-10-79	Round 1: 149 votes	**Tunisia** 143, **Niger** 140, **German Democratic Republic** 133, **Philippines** 131, Cuba 77, Colombia 68, Yugoslavia 2, Bulgaria 1, Democratic Yemen 1, Jordan 1, Libya 1, Romania 1, Zaire 1
	Round 2: 148 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 69
	Round 3: 147 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 78, Colombia 66
	Round 4: 148 votes, 4 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 65
	Round 5: 147 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 61, Peru 2, Brazil 1
48th 26-10-79	Round 6: 147 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 62
	Round 7: 148 votes, 5 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 84, Colombia 60
	Round 8: 147 votes, 5 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 61
	Round 9: 147 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 81, Colombia 63
	Round 10: 148 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 66
	Round 11: 148 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 65
	Round 12: 147 votes, 4 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 64
	Round 13: 147 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 65
49th 30-10-79	Round 14: 142 votes, 5 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 74, Colombia 63
	Round 15: 148 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 66
	Round 16: 148 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 66

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1979 UNGA 34 continued	Round 17: 148 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 78, Colombia 65, Saint Lucia 1
	Round 18: 147 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 64, Saint Lucia 1
	Round 19: 146 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 76, Colombia 62, Saint Lucia 2, Chile 1, Peru 1
33rd 02-11-79	Round 20: 144 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 77, Colombia 65
	Round 21: 146 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 78, Colombia 64
	Round 22: 147 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 78, Colombia 66
	Round 23: 147 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 60, Mexico 2, Argentina 1, Guatemala 1, Honduras 1, Saint Lucia 1
	Round 24: 148 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 63, Saint Lucia 2, Argentina 1, Chile 1, Mexico 1
	Round 25: 147 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 61, Mexico 1, Nicaragua 1, Paraguay 1, Saint Lucia 1
	Round 26: 146 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 63
	Round 27: 143 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 60
	Round 28: 144 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 62
83rd 30-11-79	Round 29: 147 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 63, Saint Lucia 1
	Round 30: 146 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 60, Peru 1, Saint Lucia 1
	Round 31: 148 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 88, Colombia 57, Mexico 1, Saint Lucia 1
	Round 32: 148 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 87, Colombia 58
	Round 33: 148 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 84, Colombia 63
	Round 34: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 59
	Round 35: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 56, Brazil 2, Chile 1, Mexico 1, Venezuela 1
	Round 36: 144 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 57, Brazil 1, Mexico 1, Uruguay 1
	Round 37: 145 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 57, Chile 1, Mexico 1, Paraguay 1, Uruguay 1
	Round 38: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 87, Colombia 57
	Round 39: 148 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 85, Colombia 62
	Round 40: 148 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 87, Colombia 60
80th 05-12-79	Round 41: 145 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 58, Uruguay 1
	Round 42: 147 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 85, Colombia 58, Uruguay 1
	Round 43: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 85, Colombia 58, Argentina 1, Uruguay 1
	Round 44: 146 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 59
	Round 45: 148 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 60
	Round 46: 148 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 60
	Round 47: 145 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 62, Uruguay 1
80th 05-12-79	Round 48: 142 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 66
	Round 49: 145 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 65
	Round 50: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 63
	Round 51: 145 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 63
	Round 52: 146 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 63
	Round 53: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 60

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1979 UNGA 34	Round 54: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 62, Brazil 1, Mexico 1, Nicaragua 1
continued	Round 55: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 84, Colombia 59, Brazil 1, El Salvador 1
	Round 56: 147 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 84, Colombia 62
	Round 57: 145 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 81, Colombia 62
	Round 58: 147 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 84, Colombia 62
98th 11-12-79	Round 59: 147 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 88, Colombia 57, Uruguay 1
	Round 60: 147 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 58, Suriname 1, Uruguay 1
	Round 61: 146 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 58, Suriname 2, Honduras 1, Uruguay 1
	Round 62: 146 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 85, Colombia 60
	Round 63: 146 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 61
	Round 64: 145 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 81, Colombia 61
	Round 65: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 58, Brazil 1, El Salvador 1, Honduras 1, Suriname 1
	Round 66: 144 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 58, Brazil 2, Chile 1
	Round 67: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 81, Colombia 57, Brazil 3, Suriname 1
	Round 68: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 81, Colombia 60
	Round 69: 141 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 58
	Round 70: 147 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 64
102nd 13-12-79	Round 71: 145 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 63
	Round 72: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 60, Brazil 1
	Round 73: 146 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 85, Colombia 57, Chile 1, Peru 1, Suriname 1
	Round 74: 148 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 59
	Round 75: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 91, Colombia 55
	Round 76: 149 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 91, Colombia 55
	Round 77: 149 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 89, Colombia 58
	Round 78: 145 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 57
	Round 79: 145 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 62
106th 17-12-79	Round 80: 149 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 89, Colombia 58
	Round 81: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 89, Colombia 56
	Round 82: 148 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 89, Colombia 57
	Round 83: 147 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 90, Colombia 54
	Round 84: 148 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 89, Colombia 55, Peru 2, Argentina 1
	Round 85: 148 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 88, Colombia 56, Peru 2, Costa Rica 1
	Round 86: 147 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 90, Colombia 56
	Round 87: 147 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 91, Colombia 55
	Round 88: 149 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 95, Colombia 53
	Round 89: 144 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 88, Colombia 54, Peru 1
	Round 90: 147 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 89, Colombia 56, Peru 1

General Assembly Session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1979 UNGA34	Round 91: 144 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 56, Peru 1
continued	Round 92: 147 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 89, Colombia 57
	Round 93: 144 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 87, Colombia 56
	Round 94: 145 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 90, Colombia 54
108th 18-12-79	Round 95: 148 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 88, Colombia 58, Peru 1
	Round 96: 147 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 84, Colombia 84, Peru 2
	Round 97: 146 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 60, Peru 3
	Round 98: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 62
	Round 99: 148 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 60
	Round 100: 148 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 88, Colombia 58
	Round 101: 147 votes, unrestricted	Cuba 87, Colombia 51, Peru 9
	Round 102: 146 votes, unrestricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 47, Peru 16, Guatemala 1, Guyana 1
	Round 103: 147 votes, unrestricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 44, Peru 23, Panama 1
	Round 104: 148 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 60
	Round 105: 145 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 88, Colombia 54
	Round 106: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 87, Colombia 57
	Round 107: 145 votes, unrestricted	Cuba 81, Colombia 52, Peru 10
	Round 108: 144 votes, unrestricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 55, Peru 7, Brazil 1, Chile 1, Saint Lucia 1
	Round 109: 147 votes, unrestricted	Cuba 81, Colombia 60, Brazil 2, Peru 2, Chile 1, Mexico 1
	Round 110: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 59
	Round 111: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 87, Colombia 58
	Round 112: 147 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 88, Colombia 58
109th 19-12-79	Round 113: 146 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 85, Colombia 57, Ecuador 1, Peru 1, Uruguay 1
	Round 114: 146 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 85, Colombia 56, Uruguay 2, Brazil 1, Ecuador 1
	Round 115: 146 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 56, Haiti 2, Uruguay 2, Brazil 1, Ecuador 1
110th 19-12-79	Round 116: 142 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 59
	Round 117: 142 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 54
	Round 118: 147 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 92, Colombia 54
	Round 119: 149 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 88, Colombia 56
	Round 120: 148 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 84, Colombia 59, Mexico 2, El Salvador 1
	Round 121: 148 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 86, Colombia 60, Honduras 1
	Round 122: 147 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 88, Colombia 57
	Round 123: 149 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 91, Colombia 57
	Round 124: 148 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 88, Colombia 58
112th 27-12-79	Round 125: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 60, Ecuador 1, Uruguay 1
	Round 126: 149 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 85, Colombia 61, Ecuador 1, Uruguay 1
	Round 127: 149 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 85, Colombia 61, Ecuador 1

General Assembly Session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1979 UNGA34	Round 128: 149 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 85, Colombia 62
continued	Round 129: 149 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 84, Colombia 63
	Round 130: 148 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 81, Colombia 65
113th 27-12-79	Round 131: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 59, Costa Rica 1, Honduras 1
	Round 132: 147 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 63, Costa Rica 1
	Round 133: 148 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 81, Colombia 64
	Round 134: 148 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 81, Colombia 65
	Round 135: 148 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 64
	Round 136: 149 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 63
	Round 137: 148 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 64, Venezuela 1
	Round 138: 147 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 62, Venezuela 2
	Round 139: 148 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 80, Colombia 62, Venezuela 2, Barbados 1
	Round 140: 143 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 78, Colombia 62
	Round 141: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 81, Colombia 63
	Round 142: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 83, Colombia 61
	Round 143: 145 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 63, Mexico 1
118th 31-12-79	Round 144: 138 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 73, Colombia 61, Mexico 2
	Round 145: 143 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 78, Colombia 60, Mexico 2, Peru 1
	Round 146: 144 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 82, Colombia 59
	Round 147: 143 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 79, Colombia 61
	Round 148: 144 votes, 5 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 78, Colombia 61
119th 04-01-80	Round 149: 139 votes, 4 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 69, Colombia 63, Honduras 1, Mexico 1, Peru 1
	Round 150: 141 votes, 5 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 70, Colombia 64, Mexico 1, Panama 1
	Round 151: 145 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	Cuba 74, Colombia 66, Mexico 1, Panama 1
	Round 152: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 74, Colombia 70
	Round 153: 146 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 72, Colombia 71
	Round 154: 146 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	Cuba 74, Colombia 69 [both withdrew in favor of the endorsement of Mexico]
120th 07-01-80	Round 155: 144 votes, 8 abstentions, unrestricted	**Mexico** 133, Cuba 3
1980 UNGA35	**22 Rounds**	
41st 20-10-1980	Round 1: 151 votes	**Japan** 141, **Uganda** 134, **Spain** 109, **Ireland** 107, Costa Rica 89, Malta 74, Guyana 9, Nicaragua 6, Panama 2, Zimabawe 2, Chad 1, Grenada 1, Senegal 1
42nd 20-10-80	Round 2: 145 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Costa Rica 74, Guyana 70
43rd 21-10-80	Round 3: 151 votes, 6 abstentions, restricted	Costa Rica 90, Guyana 47
	Round 4: 151 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Costa Rica 86, Guyana 36, Nicaragua 22, Cuba 4, Barbados 1, Chile 1, Peru 1
	Round 5: 151 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Costa Rica 87, Nicaragua 30, Guyana 25, Cuba 2, Dominican Republic 2, Panama 1, Peru 1
	Round 6: 151 votes, 2 abstentions, unrestricted	Costa Rica 86, Nicaragua 40, Guyana 19, Dominican Republic 3, Cuba 1

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1980 UNGA35	Round 7: 151 votes, 5 abstentions, restricted	Costa Rica 86, Nicaragua 60
47th 24-10-80	Round 8: 148 votes, 5 abstentions, restricted	Costa Rica 81, Nicaragua 62
	Round 9: 147 votes, 5 abstentions, restricted	Costa Rica 82, Nicaragua 60
51st 04-11-80	Round 10: 135 votes, 3 abstentions, unrestricted	**Costa Rica** 82, Panama 16, Guyana 12, Nicaragua 10, Saint Lucia 4, Brazil 3, Cuba 2, Barbados 1, Grenada 1, Peru 1
	Round 11: 143 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Costa Rica 84, Panama 38, Guyana 8, Nicaragua 7, Brazil 2, Cuba 1, Guatemala 1, Haiti 1
	Round 12: 143 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Costa Rica 83, Panama 25, Guyana 18, Nicaragua 10, Brazil 4, Cuba 2
	Round 13: 144 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Costa Rica 85, Panama 57
57th 11-11-80	Round 14: 150 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Costa Rica 75, Panama 73
	Round 15: 147 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Panama 75, Costa Rica 71
	Round 16: 150 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Panama 79, Costa Rica 62, Guyana 3, Barbados 1, Cuba 1, Ecuador 1, Nicaragua 1, Trinidad and Tobago 1
	Round 17: 149 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Panama 83, Costa Rica 62, Barbados 1, Ecuador 1, Guyana 1
	Round 18: 147 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Panama 85, Costa Rica 59, Barbados 1, Ecuador 1
	Round 19: 147 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Panama 88, Costa Rica 58
	Round 20: 146 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Panama 91, Costa Rica 53
	Round 21: 147 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	Panama 93, Costa Rica 52
61st 13-11-80	Round 22: 140 votes, 5 abstentions, unrestricted	**Panama** 111, Costa Rica 16, Cuba 2, Bolivia 1
1981 UNGA36	**1 Round**	
35th 15-10-81	Round 1: 153 votes	**Togo** 141, **Guyana** 140, **Jordan** 140, **Zaire** 140, **Poland** 139, Romania 5, Dominican Republic 3, Angola 2, Cuba 2, Mozambique 2, Algeria 1, Ethiopia 1, Hungary 1, Mongolia 1, Pakistan 1, Peru 1, Saint Lucia 1, Senegal 1, Singapore 1, Yugoslavia 1
1982 UNGA37	**3 Rounds**	
36th 19-10-82	Round 1: 153 votes	**Zimbabwe** 138, **Pakistan** 127, Netherlands 100, Malta 94, Nicaragua 92, New Zealand 77, Dominican Republic 59, Sierra Leone 6, Barbados 1, Benin 1, Comoros 1, Congo 1, Cyprus 1, Denmark 1, Ghana 1, India 1, Senegal 1
	Round 2: 155 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	**Netherlands** 103, Malta 102, Nicaragua 99, New Zealand 96, Dominican Republic 55
	Round 3: 155 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	**Malta** 111, **Nicaragua** 104, Dominican Republic 50, New Zealand 43
1983 UNGA38	**1 Round**	
40th 31-10-83	Round 1: 155 votes	**Upper Volta** 145, **India** 142, **Ukrainian SSR** 139, **Egypt** 125, **Peru** 106, Barbados 38, Algeria 24, Mexico 4, Japan 2, Sri Lanka 2, Yugoslavia 2, Argentina 1, Bahamas 1, Bangladesh 1, Bulgaria 1, Byelorussian SSR 1, Cuba 1, Libya 1, Mongolia 1

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1984 UNGA39	11 Rounds	
33rd 22-10-84	Round 1: 158 votes	**Australia** 146, **Denmark** 145, **Trinidad and Tobago** 142, Thailand 99, Ethiopia 85, Somalia 75, Mongolia 56, Ecuador 6, Austria 6, Venezuela 2, Barbados 1, Dominican Republic 1, Finland 1, Federal Republic Germany 1, Haiti 1
	Round 2: 156 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Thailand 100, Ethiopia 84, Somalia 72, Mongolia 54
34th 22-10-84	Round 3: 158 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Thailand 103, Ethiopia 82, Somalia 74, Mongolia 51
	Round 4: 158 votes, 2 abstentions, restricted	**Thailand** 106, Ethiopia 83, Somalia 72, Mongolia 49
77th 28-11-84	Round 5: 152 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Ethiopia 81, Somalia 68, United Republic of Tanzania 2
	Round 6: 149 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Ethiopia 77, Somalia 66, Kenya 2, United Republic of Tanzania 2
	Round 7: 150 votes, 1 abstention, unrestricted	Ethiopia 76, Somalia 67, United Republic of Tanzania 3, Kenya 2, Cameroon 1
	Round 8: 151 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Ethiopia 79, Somalia 70
	Round 9: 152 votes, restricted	Ethiopia 78, Somalia 72
	Round 10: 152 votes, restricted	Ethiopia 75, Somalia 75 [both withdrew in favor of endorsement of Madagascar]
105th 18-12-84	Round 11: 147 votes, 11 abstentions, unrestricted	**Madagascar** 126, Kenya 4, Comoros 3, Burundi 1, Mali 1, Morocco 1
1985 UNGA40	4 Rounds	
38th 17-10-85	Round 1: 148 votes, 1 abstention	**Bulgaria** 135, **Congo** 133, **Venezuela** 131, **United Arab Emirates** 126, Liberia 87, Ghana 45, Cameroon 7, German Democratic Republic 2, Pakistan 2, Syria 2, Bangladesh 1, Bolivia 1, Burundi 1, Cuba 1, Dominican Republic 1, Gabon 1, Jamaica 1, Japan 1, Mexico 1, Mozambique 1
	Round 2: 156 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Ghana 81, Liberia 70
	Round 3: 154 votes, restricted	Ghana 94, Liberia 59
	Round 4: 156 votes, restricted	**Ghana** 109, Liberia 46
1986 UNGA41	1 Round	
40th 17-10-86	Round 1: 154 votes	**Zambia** 154, **Argentina** 143, **Italy** 143, **Federal Republic of Germany** 111, **Japan** 107, India 36, Sweden 16, Ireland 14, Bolivia 3, Argentina 1, Belgium 1, Belize 1, Cuba 1, Finland 1, Greece 1, Lesotho 1, Malaysia 1, Mexico 1, Netherlands 1, Senegal 1, Sudan 1
1987 UNGA42	2 Rounds	
40th 20-10-87	Round 1: 158 votes	**Brazil** 151, **Yugoslavia** 146, **Nepal** 144, **Senegal** 132, Algeria 108, Morocco 61, Nigeria 2, Benin 1, Guyana 1, India 1, Libya 1, Pakistan 1, Romania 1
	Round 2: 158 votes, 3 abstentions, restricted	**Algeria** 113, 51, Morocco 42
1988 UNGA43	3 Rounds	
37th 26-10-88	Round 1: 157 votes	Colombia 158, **Ethiopia** 144, **Canada** 127, Malaysia 104, Finland 100, Greece 77, Bangladesh 55, Somalia 3, Cuba 2, Bahamas 1, Mauritius 1, Sudan 1
	Round 2: 158 votes, restricted	Malaysia 147, Finland 99, Greece 56, Bangladesh 3
	Round 3: 157 votes, restricted	Finland 110, Greece 47

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1989 UNGA44	**1 Round**	
34th 24-10-89	Rounds 1: 157 votes	**Cuba** 146, **Democratic Republic of Yemen** 140, **Romania** 136, **Cote d'Ivoire** 135, **Zaire** 128, Yemen 6, Argentina 1, Barbados 1, Costa Rica 1, Ghana 1, India 1, Mali 1, Niger 1, Poland 1, Zambia 1
1990 UNGA45	**1 Round**	
36th 09-11-90	Round 1: 154 votes	**Austria** 130, **Ecuador** 149, **Zimbabwe** 146, **Belgium** 143, **India** 141, Sri Lanka 2, Australia 1, Spain 1, Hungary 1, Iran 1, Japan 1, Liechtenstein 1, Mexico 1, Peru 1, Tanzania 1, Sweden 1, Venezuela 1, Yugoslavia 1
1991 UNGA46	**1 Round**	
32nd 17-10-91	Round 1: 161 votes	**Cape Verde** 158, **Japan** 158, **Venezuela** 154, **Hungary** 149, **Morocco** 148, Nigeria 2, Argentina 1, Honduras 1, Tunisia 1, Yugoslavia 1
1992 UNGA47	**3 Rounds**	
48th 11-11-92	Round 1: 173 votes	**Djibouti** 170, **Brazil** 168, **Pakistan** 161, **Spain** 118, Sweden 109, New Zealand 108, Iran 1, Nigeria 1
	Round 2: 173 votes, restricted	New Zealand 99, Sweden 74
	Round 3: 172 votes, restricted	**New Zealand** 117, Sweden 55
1993 UNGA48	**4 Rounds**	
43rd 29-10-93	Round 1: 176 votes	**Oman** 174, **Argentina** 169, **Rwanda** 153, Czech Republic 113, Guinea-Bissau 82, Belarus 62, Burundi 2, Honduras 1
	Round 2: 176 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	**Czech Republic** 127, Nigeria 105, Guinea-Bissau 68, Belarus 47
	Round 3: 176 votes, 1 abstention, restricted	Nigeria 116, Guinea-Bissau 59
44th 29-10-93	Round 4: 162 votes, 8 abstentions, restricted	**Nigeria** 119, Guinea-Bissau 33 [withdrew]
1994 UNGA49	**1 Round**	
40th 20-10-94	Round 1: 170 votes	**Honduras** 170, **Botswana** 168, **Italy** 167, **Germany** 164, **Indonesia** 164, Australia 1, Japan 1
1995 UNGA50	**1 Round**	
53rd 08-11-95	Round 1: 177 votes	**Chile** 168, **Egypt** 159, **Republic of Korea** 156, **Guinea-Bissau** 128, **Poland** 128, Benin 60, Albania 48, Ghana 1, Mexico 1, Tunisia 1
1996 UNGA51	**2 Rounds**	
39th 21-10-96	Round 1: 181 votes	**Kenya** 172, **Sweden** 153, **Japan** 142, Portugal 112, Costa Rica 105, Australia 91, Bolivia 73, India 40, Colombia 1, Dominican Republic 1
	Round 2: 181 votes	**Costa Rica** 167, **Portugal** 124, Australia 57, Bolivia 5 [withdrew]
1997 UNGA52	**1 Round**	
30th 14-10-97	Round 1: 174 votes	**Bahrain** 172, **Gabon** 171, **Gambia** 169, **Brazil** 167, **Slovenia** 140, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 30, Argentina 1, Zambia 1

General Assembly session	Election rounds	Candidate countries and votes
1998 UNGA53	**1 Round**	
33rd 08-10-98	Round 1: 176 votes	**Malaysia** 174, **Argentina** 171, **Namibia** 167, **Canada** 131, **Netherlands** 122, Greece 87, Chile 1, Philippines 1, Senegal 1, Zimbabwe 1
1999 UNGA54	**4 Rounds**	
34th 14-10-99	Round 1: 172 votes	**Bangladesh** 172, **Tunisia** 172, **Mali** 171, **Jamaica** 171, Ukraine 92, Slovakia 79
	Round 2: 171 votes, restricted	Ukraine 98, Slovakia 72
	Round 3: 170 votes, restricted	Ukraine 113, Slovakia 57 [withdrew]
	Round 4: 168 votes, 6 abstentions, restricted	**Ukraine** 158, Slovakia 3
2000 UNGA55	**4 Rounds**	
32nd 10-10-00	Round 1: 173 votes	**Colombia** 168, **Singapore** 168, **Ireland** 130, Norway 114, Italy 94, Mauritius 95, Sudan 69
	Round 2: 173 votes, restricted	Mauritius 102, Norway 100, Italy 70, Sudan 65
	Round 3: 172 votes, restricted	Mauritius 110, Norway 110, Italy 62, Sudan 58
	Round 4: 173 votes, restricted	**Norway** 115, **Mauritius** 113, Italy 57, Sudan 55
2001 UNGA56	**2 Rounds**	
23rd 08-10-01	Round 1: 178 votes	**Guinea** 173, **Cameroon** 172, **Syrian Arab Republic** 160, **Bulgaria** 120, Mexico 116, Dominican Republic 60, Belarus 53, Dominica 1
	Round 2: 178 votes, restricted	**Mexico** 138, Dominican Republic 40
2002 UNGA57	**1 Round**	
20th 27-09-02	Round 1: 183 votes	**Angola** 181, **Germany** 180, **Spain** 180, **Chile** 178, **Pakistan** 172, India 1
2003 UNGA58	**1 Round**	
42nd 23-10-03	Round 1: 182 votes	**Benin** 181, **Philippines** 179, **Algeria** 178, **Brazil** 177, **Romania** 174, Argentina 1, Poland 1, Republic of Korea 1
2004 UNGA59	**Round 1**	
32nd 15-10-4	Round 1: 189 votes	**Argentina** 188, **Greece** 187, **United Republic of Tanzania** 186, **Japan** 184, **Denmark** 181, Bhutan 1

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-ninth session
Agenda items 96, 97 and 148

Crime prevention and criminal justice

International drug control

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixtieth year

Note verbale dated 25 July 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Cape Verde to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cape Verde to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the action plan adopted by the regional expert workshop on the ratification and implementation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption as well as on the drafting of reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council, which was held in Praia, from 8 to 10 December 2004 (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of Cape Verde would be grateful if the Secretary-General could bring the action plan to the attention of the General Assembly, under agenda items 96, 97 and 148, and of the Security Council.

05-44162 (E) 290705

Annex to the note verbale dated 25 July 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Cape Verde to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Regional expert workshop on the ratification and implementation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption as well as on the drafting of reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council

Praia, Cape Verde, 8-10 December 2004

Action plan

We, Participants of the Regional Expert Workshop on the ratification and implementation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption as well as on the drafting of reports to the Counter -Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council, held in Praia, Republic of Cape Verde between 8 and 10 December 2004, representatives of the following countries:

- Angola
- Benin
- Cape Verde
- Republic of Congo
- Democratic Republic of Congo
- Côte d'Ivoire
- Gabon
- Gambia
- Ghana
- Guinea Conakry
- Guinea Bissau
- Equatorial Guinea
- Mauritania
- Mozambique
- Nigeria
- Sao Tome and Principe
- Senegal
- Sierra Leone
- Togo

1. Convey our profound appreciation to the Government of the Republic of Cape Verde, and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and Communities, for having hosted this Regional Expert Workshop in Praia from 8 to 10 December 2004;

2. Appreciate the efforts of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for the collective action undertaken in the co-organization of this Seminar and for all the assistance provided in the drafting of the reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council;

3. Equally appreciate the contribution of donor States for having made possible the holding of this Seminar;

4. Recognize the urgent need for the countries that have not yet done so to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as well as to fully and effectively implement it, which is a significant contribution to the global anti-terrorist efforts; and extend our gratitude to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for offering its assistance in this process;

5. Urge our respective States to forward the pending supplementary report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the United Nations Security Council and the Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1267 of the Security Council, within the timeframe requested by these committees; and for the States who have not yet done so within the set deadlines, to do so by 1 March 2005;

6. Urge our respective States to become parties to the 12 universal instruments against terrorism, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, its three Protocols, and to the United Nations Convention against Corruption as soon as possible;

7. Urge our respective States to address technical assistance requests to the CTC in the areas covered by Resolution 1373 (2001) of the Security Council and not covered by the requests mentioned below;

8. Recommend to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to facilitate the translation of the reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, for those countries whose official languages are not official languages of the United Nations;

9. Recommend the appointment of a focal point, within each participating State, which coordinates the activities of the competent State authorities, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Interior, Defence and Finance, on matters related to the fight against transnational organized crime and terrorism;

10. In this context, the representatives of the delegations have made the following technical assistance requests to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime:

- ANGOLA: technical assistance for the training of experts with regards to the prevention and suppression of money laundering and the financing of terrorism;

- BENIN: technical assistance for the training of experts with regards to the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption, in particular for judicial police officers and magistrates in matters relating to the repression of terrorism and transnational organized crime;

- CAPE VERDE: technical assistance for the implementation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption, in particular on money laundering; for the training of experts, namely in matters relating to investigations and detention of suspicious transactions;

- REPUBLIC OF CONGO: assistance for the training of experts with regards to the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption; as well as for the establishment and organization of a financial intelligence unit and the training of its staff;

- DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: legal assistance for the ratification and incorporation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption; for the training of experts with regards to the aforementioned instruments;

- CÔTE D'IVOIRE: technical assistance for the ratification and implementation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption; as well as for the training of experts in matters relating to the aforementioned instruments; for the training of experts with regards to the aforementioned instruments;

- GABON: technical assistance for the drafting of a text concerning the establishment, organization and operation of a national financial investigation agency, including the provision of examples of States which have established such an agency; for the incorporation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption; for the training of experts with regards to these instruments; for the establishment of a financial intelligence unit and the training of its staff;

- GAMBIA: legislative assistance for the ratification and incorporation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption; for the establishment of a law in matters related to transnational organized crime; for the training of experts related to matters of the said instruments;

- GHANA: technical assistance for a project proposal for the creation of a national financial intelligence unit and to transmit to the CTC the requests for assistance on border control; as well as capacity-building of relevant staff of the financial intelligence unit through training, including good practices recorded in other countries where such agencies are run; legislative incorporation of the universal instruments against terrorism, corruption, and transnational organized crime including money laundering; for the training of experts in matters relating to the aforementioned instruments;

- GUINEA: assistance for the incorporation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption in the Penal Code and Penal Procedure Code, in particular for the re-editing of these codes; for the training of experts with regards to these instruments;

- GUINEA BISSAU: legislative assistance for the ratification and incorporation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption; for the training of experts in matters related to the aforementioned instruments;

- EQUATORIAL GUINEA: technical assistance for a project proposal for the creation of a national financial intelligence unit and the transmission to the CTC of the requests for assistance on border control and mercenarism; as well as capacity-building of relevant staff of the financial intelligence unit through training in Spanish language, including good practices recorded in other countries where such agencies are run; legislative incorporation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime (including money laundering) and corruption; for the training of experts in matters relating to the aforementioned instruments;

- MAURITANIA: technical assistance for the incorporation of the universal instruments against terrorism and transnational organized crime; for the training of experts with regards to these instruments; for the elaboration of an extradition bill;

- MOZAMBIQUE: technical assistance for the implementation and incorporation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption, in particular the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorism, for the training of experts in matters relating to these instruments;

- NIGERIA: technical assistance in matters relating to the training of experts in the universal instruments against terrorism and transnational organized crime;

- SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE: evaluation mission regarding the need for technical assistance with regards to the incorporation and implementation of the universal instruments against terrorism, transnational organized crime and corruption, in particular concerning money laundering and the financing of terrorism, in addition to the training of experts in these areas;

- SENEGAL: assistance in matters relating to the training of experts in the universal instruments against terrorism and transnational organized crime, in particular for the suppression of the financing of terrorism and money laundering; legal assistance for the ratification and incorporation of the United Nations Convention against

Corruption; establishment of a national unit for the processing and transmission of financial information;

- SIERRA LEONE: technical assistance for a project proposal for the creation of a national financial intelligence unit and capacity-building for its staff through training, including good practices recorded in other countries where such agencies are run;

- TOGO: technical assistance in matters relating to the training of experts in the universal instruments against terrorism and transnational organized crime, in parti. lar on the suppression of the financing of terrorism; technical assistance for the ratification and incorporation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption;

11. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime shall transmit the requests forwarded by all delegations to the financing organizations for the supply of technical, material as well as financial assistance, namely for the creation and implementation of their services, the reinforcement of the cross-border control, including the training of personnel and the editing of the confidential documentation, control mechanisms of the traces of the passenger, the improvement of technical equipment of identification, detention and surveillance.

The participants

United Nations A/59/883

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Fifty-ninth session
Agenda item 120
Administration of justice at the United Nations

Administration of justice in the Secretariat

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted in response to the request of the General Assembly, in its resolution 59/283, for the Secretary-General to present proposals to separate the functions of the Administrative Law Unit in order to avoid conflict of interest, through redeployment of resources, and to report to the Assembly thereon by the end of its fifty-ninth session, taking into account the following needs: (a) to ensure the necessary means to collect evidence; (b) to advise both the appellant and the respondent; (c) to ensure the uniform application of administrative decisions; (d) to ensure appropriate consultations with the Office of Human Resources Management and legal experts; and (e) to relay all necessary information to the Office of Human Resources Management.

The Secretary-General has analysed the current situation, including whether a conflict of interest exists and the need to take into account the requirements set out in resolution 59/283.

05-44291 (E) 170805

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to a request by the General Assembly in its resolution 59/283 of 13 April 2005. In paragraph 29 of that resolution, the Assembly noted that the Administrative Law Unit had the multiple functions of administrative review, appeals, disciplinary matters and advisory services. In paragraph 30, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly, by the end of its fifty-ninth session, proposals to separate the above-mentioned functions, through the redeployment of resources, in order to avoid conflicts of interest, taking into account the following needs:

(a) To ensure the necessary means to collect evidence;

(b) To advise both the appellant and the respondent;

(c) To ensure the uniform application of administrative decisions;

(d) To ensure appropriate consultations with the Office of Human Resources Management and legal experts;

(e) To relay all necessary information to the Office of Human Resources Management.

II. Functions of the Administrative Law Unit

2. The functions of the Administrative Law Unit related to appeals include:

(a) On behalf of the Secretary-General, the review of administrative decisions upon the request of individual staff members who believe that their terms of appointment were not observed when those decisions were taken. Under staff rule 111.2 (a), this review constitutes the first step of the appeals process. The Unit reviews all requests to identify the issues and obtains the comments of the manager who has made the decision under review. The Unit also draws the attention of the office to the fact that, through this process, it can resolve potential cases before a formal appeals process is initiated. Whenever possible or useful, a formal review letter is prepared and sent to the staff member explaining why the administrative decision is being maintained or changed;

(b) Representation of the Secretary-General ("respondent") in proceedings before the Joint Appeals Board in New York after a staff member has submitted an appeal to the Board against the initial administrative decision if no formal review has been conducted or in response to the answer received after such review.[1] At that point in the process, the Unit prepares the respondent's reply, answers any questions that may be asked by the Board pertaining to the case and appears before the Board in the event that oral proceedings are scheduled. If a formal review letter is prepared before the appeal is filed, that letter may serve as the respondent's reply or may become an integral part of it;

(c) Representation of the respondent before the Board when a staff member requests suspension of action of an administrative decision;

(d) Advice to managers who consult the Unit on the proper application of human resources policies and rules in order to address, as early as possible, issues that might otherwise become formal appeals.

III. Complementarity of functions related to appeals

3. The request of the General Assembly for proposals to separate the functions of the Administrative Law Unit appears to be based on the view that there is a conflict of interest when the same unit handles the request for administrative review, prepares the respondent's reply and represents the respondent in the same case. The Secretary-General does not share that view.

4. The Administrative Law Unit, while functionally assigned the execution of responsibilities related to appeal matters, is an integral part of the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM) and, within that Office, of the Division for Organizational Development. It acts on behalf of the Administration at all times and at all stages in the appeal process. This role is made clear to all parties from the initiation of the appeals process. It is in that capacity that at the review stage, or even beforehand when difficult situations occur that might give rise to litigation if not properly addressed, the Unit explores the possibility of avoiding unnecessary litigation by working with its counterparts in OHRM, or with the executive and administrative offices concerned, with regard to decisions for which authority has been delegated. It is standard practice for staff of the Unit who are called upon to discuss a situation with an appellant or potential appellant and/or his or her counsel to remind their interlocutors that they represent the Administration. This is not mediation or arbitration where the mediator or arbitrator would act as a neutral third party. Informal resolution efforts are sometimes initiated by the Unit and sometimes by the staff member or the member's counsel, as is done in national judicial systems when opposing parties wish to explore the possibility of resolving a case outside the formal litigation process. If no mutually acceptable solution can be found, the staff member's right to proceed to formal litigation is unimpeded.

5. With respect to the needs identified by the General Assembly in resolution 59/283, the Secretary-General would make the following comments:

(a) *To ensure the necessary means to collect evidence*: the combination of responsibilities currently discharged by the Administrative Law Unit in matters related to the appeals process results in a significant economy of resources at the stage of establishing the facts and legal issues involved in a particular case. This stage is an absolute necessity, without which there can be no meaningful advice to managers, no reasonable review of the administrative decision and no complete reply from the respondent. From that perspective, it would appear that the present distribution of functions meets the need to ensure the necessary means to collect evidence better than if the facts have to be established in two separate offices, as would be the case if the review functions were to be separated from the others;

(b) *To advise both the appellant and the respondent*: as stated above, the Administrative Law Unit represents the respondent at all stages of the appeals process. The Panel of Counsel represents appellants during the process. The rules also allow staff members to be represented by counsel of their choice. There is therefore no conflict of interest on the part of the Unit under the current distribution of functions;

(c) (d) and (e) *To ensure the uniform application of administrative decisions, to ensure consultation with OHRM and legal experts and to relay all necessary information to OHRM*: As an integral part of OHRM, the Administrative Law Unit has immediate and direct access to all relevant officials and has a variety of internal

and efficient means to consult and to provide or receive information within that Office. Should the review functions be given to another office, a whole new system of communications would have to be put into place. In addition, since OHRM remains the central authority within the Secretariat for the interpretation and enforcement of the Staff Regulations and Rules, the ability of the Unit to consult easily within the Office helps to ensure the uniform application of administrative decisions.

IV. Current capacity

6. Beyond the substantive aspects of the question as to whether the separation of the functions currently discharged by the Administrative Law Unit is necessary or desirable, the General Assembly specified in its request for proposals to separate these functions that this should be done through the redeployment of resources. The Secretary-General does not consider such a separation to be possible. Currently, the Unit has two Professional posts in the regular budget, one at the P-5 level for the Chief of Unit and another at the P-3 level. In order to deal with the number of requests for review/appeals and disciplinary cases emanating from peacekeeping missions, two P-4 posts are provided through the support account. The Chief of Unit supervises all of the work done in the Unit and performs other managerial functions as required, in addition to dealing with appeals and disciplinary cases. Given the limited number of budgeted posts and the workload, general temporary assistance has also been provided to the Unit. An additional P-3 post has been proposed in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 in order to release general temporary assistance to focus on the backlog of appeals and to ensure that all cases remain current.

7. Currently there is no one person dedicated to the review function in the Administrative Law Unit; all Professional staff are expected to handle a number of cases at the same time and to prepare formal administrative reviews of decisions and responses to appeals as well as handling disciplinary cases and appearing before the Joint Appeals Board and the Joint Disciplinary Committee whenever hearings are scheduled. It would not be possible, therefore, to redeploy resources from that Unit without introducing new and substantial delays in appeals as well as in disciplinary cases and in the provision of advisory services. In addition, separation of the review function from the Unit to another office would result in a duplication of work as the facts of each case would have to be established and the legal issues understood and addressed at the review stage and then again at the litigation stage. There would not, therefore, be any decrease in the level of work that would have to be performed by the Unit. This duplication of work would require additional resources.

8. Should the General Assembly decide, however, that the review functions should no longer be discharged by the Administrative Law Unit, a decision would have to be made as to where these functions should be located in future. Options could include the Office of Legal Affairs or the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. Given the similarity in the functions performed by the Unit before the Joint Appeals Board and the functions performed by the Office of Legal Affairs before the Administrative Tribunal, placement of the functions in the Office of Legal Affairs would not address the Assembly's view that there is a conflict of interest when one office performs both the review and appeals functions. The conflict of interest issue would also arise if the review functions were placed in the Executive

Office of the Secretary-General, since the Secretary-General is the final authority on all administrative decisions.

V. Conclusion

9. **In view of the substantive and resource considerations outlined above, it is the view of the Secretary-General that it would not be in the interests of the Organization to separate the functions of the Administrative Law Unit. The Secretary-General believes that the issues raised will also be reviewed in a systematic way by the redesign panel, with a view to preparing a comprehensive solution to ensure that the Organization has the most effective administration of justice system.**[3]

Notes

[1] Joint Appeals Boards are also established at the United Nations Offices at Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi to consider appeals submitted by staff members serving at those duty stations or administered by organizational units located at those duty stations.

[2] Resolution 59/266, sect. I, para. 2.

[3] The redesign panel will be established in accordance with General Assembly resolution 50/203, para. 49 (c).